

SEPTEMBER, 1961

ARMED FORCES

Management

PUBLISHED FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES OF THE FREE WORLD



Single Management Expert Col. Charles C. Case

Single Managers Revolutionize Military Supply 18
Paul Nitze: Political Aspects of a National Strategy 22




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International Editors

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J. S. Butz, Robert M. Loebelson.

Bureaus

LOS ANGELES 8929 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills
NEW YORK 20 East 46th Street
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Floyd G. Arpan Editorial Consultant
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David Ross Robertson Asst. Art Director
R. Virgil Parker Production Manager
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Regional Advertising Offices

Ray Quirk Eastern Manager
20 East 46th St., New York, 17, N.Y., YUKON
6-3900.

Greg Kane Midwest Manager
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Edwin Denker, Ronald K. Rose West
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International Advertising Offices

Geneva, Switzerland, 10 Rue Grenus, 321044, Cable
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PUBLISHER'S COMMENT

'More or Less Personal'

MAGAZINE EDITORS sometimes react much like adoring wives and efficient secretaries: they like to be told they are needed.

Recently we have received an abnormal number of requests from readers to reprint or quote from articles, head-expanding praise which, naturally, makes our editors inordinantly happy.

These requests have come from such places as the Air University, the Army War College, a handful of high ranking officers, and commanders in all three services asking permission to reprint AFM material as "must reading" by people in their classes and/or commands.

To bring AFM's staff down out of the stratosphere, in all fairness, we are obligated to point out that the largest share of the credit belongs to the Department of Defense and Secretary McNamara—whose 8-month record gets "A's" on our editorial staff report card (see page 15). The editors' main success has been in keeping a tight finger on the military pulse, spot and publicize what the new team is trying to do—and as more top military decision-makers recognize this, the number of requests to re-use AFM stories increases.

Item—Feelings are running high on the long list of problems Pentagon management faces. One highly explosive area is personnel management, and in this area AFM has received not one but many well-written (sometimes vitriolic) complaints. Regardless of whether these complaints are justified or whether they exist due to a lack of proper communication, the point that makes our editor happy is that the writers felt AFM was the best place to bring the argument out into the open. (See page 47).

Item—A key-job Colonel in Air Force Operations told us, in the course of an interview, "your magazine is the only valuable source we have for cross-pollination of ideas on how other people are doing our type of job efficiently."

Thus, because of the very real participating interest of our military readers, AFM, in effect, has the largest editorial staff in the world: the several thousand people in the Pentagon, key installations around the country, and among NATO committed forces overseas. Dedicated and conscientious, these unofficial editors, regardless of service affiliation try to crank more economy efficiency and effectiveness into the Defense operation, and funnel us (often anonymously) much of the material filling our trend pages, and lend the incisive, pointed flavor to staff written articles such as the military transportation story on page 20.

Occasionally our military editors assistants charge off under their own bylined banners as Col. Charles C. Case did this month on the single manager story (which Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics Tom Morris himself contributed heavily to), the analysis of military-civilian personnel difficulties by Colonel John Douglass on page 56, and the NATO early warning story by Colonel Kent K. Parrot on page 38.

A special bonus ferreted out by our editors is the important but little-known Cold War document written by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze just prior to the time he assumed the ISA post. (See page 22).

In sum, our unofficial editors' contribution to this issue, being typical, means AFM will continue to provide a wealth of information to aid you in carrying out your Defense management job—principally because AFM has become what it was designed to be—not our magazine but yours.

C. W. Borklund

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ON
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THE
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ARMED FORCES

Management

PUBLISHED FOR THE MILITARY SERVICES OF THE FREE WORLD

SEPTEMBER, 1961

Volume 7—No. 12

FEATURES

- Has Success Phased Out Supply Single Managers?..... 18**

An expert on military single management describes the successful application of single managers to the Department of Defense supply operation and how they stand to be replaced by a unified logistics system.

- MATS, MSTS, MTMA—Needed: A Single Manager 20**

A single manager controlling military air, land and sea traffic management functions is offered as the solution to the problems of the huge military transportation operation now involving three separate single managers: Military Air Transport Service, Military Sea Transport Service, and Military Traffic Management Agency.

- Political Aspects of a National Strategy: Paul Nitze 22**

One of the important Cold War documents written by Paul H. Nitze just prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. The article provides an expert analysis of the Communist threat and what our counter-strategy should be.

- European Early Warning: Key to NATO's Air Defense. 38**

Surrounded on all sides by Soviet offensive forces, the problem of air defense of European countries and the NATO forces defending them is one of the most complex problems facing the West.

- Reserve Officer Hiring: Unfair?..... 47**

Civil Servants corresponding with AFM charge that reserve officers are being favored for civil service jobs at military bases in resort areas, allowing them to "retire with pay" amidst comfortable surroundings. Both sides of the controversy are presented.

- Military-Civilian Working Relationships..... 56**

An analysis by a career Army officer of the growing day to day problems creating friction between Defense military and civilian personnel.

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NEXT MONTH:

Progress Report on ICBM Site Activation . . . European Research: A Special Report . . . NATO's Industrial Base: The Untapped Resources . . .


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Quite naturally we're a little partial to the RCA 601. We know what went into creating it, and we know what it will do. But, frankly, we'd rather that you didn't take our word for it. Instead, we'd much prefer to have you put it to the most rigid comparison you can conceive . . . for the biggest business or scientific operations. Compare it for everything you might ever want in an ultra-high speed computer . . . and let the RCA 601 speak for itself. Here are a few of the facts you'll discover . . .

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
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
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


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
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McNamara's Team: A Report Card

Good Grades for the First Eight Months

For sheer bone-jarring impact, Robert S. McNamara's Defense team has been as devastating within the confines of the Pentagon as his Irish namesake's "drum-banging, cymbal-clanging" band would have been in an Olde English tea house.

And though it is too early to guess what final assessment future historians will give the Defense Department's present team, two characteristics certain to be mentioned will be their dedication to changing the old order and the willingness of their leader to make timely decisions and use unorthodox methods.

McNamara began by reversing one of the proven dielectics of Pentagon dogma: that it takes two years for a new Secretary of Defense to really understand what he is supposed to be doing. He let it be known that the rest of the Department of Defense was going to have to understand what *he* wanted to do—and in a lot less time than two years.

One result his tradition-crumbing approach has evoked is extreme praise and damnation by his employees. "He'll never get anywhere because he never bothered to learn the system" from one quarter is countered by "he's the best Secretary of Defense the nation has had since James Forrestal."

Unfortunately, McNamara's chances of being thought of as another Forrestal by the taxpayers (if he cares about it at all) appears unlikely. The larger defense base he advocates and the more complex defense systems he needs will cost the nation more money, and a majority of his changes (though provoking within the Pentagon) don't have the glamour to attract big headlines, and require a rather sophisticated audience to be understood.

McNamara's approach to his job amounts, basically, to ignoring all the old, deadening, red tape-provoking patterns of government operation and substituting a system predicated on common sense and dedicated to the proposition that it is more effective to deal with people than offices.

One key to this approach is McNamara's growing list of problems—more than 140 at last count. He assigns these headaches to individuals and asks them to come up with answers. He then demands almost weekly reports on what progress the individual is making in affecting the accepted solution.

If it takes a strong man to discipline a cage full of lions, it takes endurance to keep them in line. Only the future will reveal whether McNamara's changes are

indelible on the surface of U. S. military history or will wash away with the first tide of reaction.

The eight-month report card, however is impressive. Among the highlights:

1—Instituting a common sense approach to budget formation. The "program package" budget has been advocated by financial experts in and around the Pentagon for years, but it took McNamara and his new comptroller Charles J. Hitch to institute the system.

2—Strengthening of the Defense Communications Agency and initiating preliminary planning towards setting up a centralized intelligence information agency.

3—Eliminating the jobs of two assistant Secretaries, and reducing the number of channels needed to get proposed actions approved.

4—Launching investigations into how the single manager concept can be further utilized in supply operations.

5—Establishment of the Management Planning Office. Reporting to the General Counsel, this little known but highly influential office could well have been responsible for suggesting many of the moves noted above.

6—Taking immediate steps to increase the military airlift, beef up conventional war power, build increased capability to exercise options in the use of national armaments, establish a survivable command and control system, and moving to marry the Army's STRAC troops with the Air Force's tactical aircraft to produce a single functional fighting organization that owes allegiance to its job and not its uniform.

7—Cutting down on the amount of sole source procurement—long a danger area in Defense expenditure of dollars.

8—Launching a base closing program (which has virtually ignored politics) and thereby cutting waste out of Defense operating cost and at the same time helping to ease the economic consequences.

In summation, we believe that the McNamara team has accomplished more in its first eight months than has any other group in comparable Pentagon history. We have disagreed with many specific proposals of the McNamara team, but find it most refreshing (as do many Pentagon people who have lost an argument or two) that after over a decade of wandering around trying to figure out who was calling the shots, there now is absolutely no question in anybody's mind about where to go to get a decision in a hurry.



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Some of these techniques are contributing to such Raytheon achievements as FPS-28 and SPS-38 radar systems, and MK 74 fire control systems. All are facilitating Raytheon's development of the Mauler fire control system and FAA's Bright Display radar programs.

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Washington Background

Breaking The Ban?

Look for the Russians to initiate a series of spectacular nuclear shots—including one detonated by the war head of a spent ICBM—which dignitaries of foreign nations will be invited to witness.

Background: The theory held by many U.S. experts is that Russia, testing on the sly, has now progressed to the point where it would be more advantageous to flex its nuclear muscles than continue to pay lip service to the disarmament and test ban efforts.

They hope to achieve a propaganda victory with the nuclear shots comparable to the ones attained with their space men, cowing smaller nations, attempting to split the western camp and force "Munich" type surrenders at the conference table, and proclaiming once again to underdeveloped nations that the U.S. is merely a paper tiger and that the Soviet Union has the superior technological skills to help them with their aspirations.

More Steps In Reorganization

As noted in these columns several months ago, incoming Defense Secretary McNamara could exercise a considerable amount of administrative authority in building greater centralized civilian control of the Defense operation—particularly in the Pentagon. That he has done so in impressive fashion is now a matter of well-publicized record (See *View From Here*.)

What has not been noted is that McNamara is coming to many of the same conclusions about DOD reorganization long held by the Air Force. Such recent moves as centralizing the intelligence activity, strengthening the single communications agency, and setting up a single *functional* fighting unit including STRAC and Air Force tactical fighters are remarkably similar to the Air Force reorganization proposals first circulated by AF planners around the Pentagon over a year ago.

Stumbling Blocks For Hitch's Budget

Defense Comptroller Charles J. Hitch's timetable for developing a sensible budget compilation procedure is still in trouble.

Major reason: critics of the idea, who recognized early that the improved "program package" budget method idea was a threat to their little inbred empires, are lurking under the surface waiting for the first sign of slippage in order to scuttle the whole effort.

AFM's editors have been told by some service-budgeteers with narrow vision that a concerted effort could kill the Hitch budget idea on the first go-around. They feel they can do so without jeopardizing their jobs—or empires—by acts of omission rather than commission.

The second part of the two-pronged attack will come from Congress, where the opposers of change will unobtrusively seek support, relying on the old DOD rule veteran civil servants learned long ago that "you can get your boss' decision overruled if you don't like the sound of it."

Now that the U.S. is in the process of rescinding the impractical policy of not supplying NATO partners with nuclear weapons, it now warns its European allies not to become trigger happy.

Roger Hillsman, Director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department recently warned that NATO must try to avoid using nuclear weapons until it can no longer halt an attack with conventional forces alone. In an address to the San Francisco World Affairs Council, Hillsman said American strategy was no longer based primarily on a concept of massive retaliation, Hillsman said "with the newer American policy of evolving adequate forces to meet the various types of potential attack while holding the nuclear deterrent in reserve for use only as appropriate, Europeans have every reason to cooperate fully in the effort to increase conventional forces."

Whether our NATO allies—especially France—will think kindly of the U.S. attempting to tell them how to contain the enemy at their back door remains to be seen.

U.S. Lectures NATO On A-Weapon Use

Has Success Phased Out Supply Single Managers?

After a rough start single managers have revolutionized military supply procedures—paving the way for greater unification and the elimination of their jobs.

by Colonel Charles C. Case, USA
Staff Director, Commodity Single Manager Division
OSD (I & L)

The author, Col. Charles Case, is considered by his superiors to be one of the real experts on single managements. His article relates the history of supply single managements, their success, and the imminent reorganization that will replace them. Col. Case was formerly Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (S&L).



Electronic Management

FIVE YEARS have now passed since the first four Single Manager Supply Agencies were established by Department of Defense Directives in 1956. The creation of these agencies was a marked departure from traditional concepts of military logistics. The change-over was not an easy one.

Nor has it met with complete success in every instance. Auditors, inspectors, and agency personnel themselves still unearth occasional instances of erroneous data, faulty requirements, imprudent buys, or other wasteful actions. Viewed in proper perspective, however, the Single Managers' attainments by far outweigh their mistakes.

Major credit for the success of the Single Manager plan belongs to enlightened and objective leadership given the agencies by the Executive Directors and their staffs during the trying formative period and to the Military Department officials who backed them with assistance and resources. Fortunately, the leaders who directed the Single Manager agencies had the objectivity and breadth to set aside parochial interests in favor of a defense-wide viewpoint.

These men, still more fortunately, had the boldness to experiment and innovate and the wisdom to discard persistent but antiquated ways.

If any technical factor can be singled out as contributing to their success in converting an untried and unpopular idea into a proven, accepted, and expanding reality, it was ADP. The role of ADP will be even more decisive in the future, for now the Single Managers have invaded the complex technical commodities. The responsive and efficient management of these commodities would be next to impossible without ADP.

At present, there are approximately 3,700,000 items in the military supply system. The first four agencies to be established (Subsistence, Clothing and Textiles, Medical Supplies, and Petroleum) brought some 40,000 common-use items under integrated management. While the percentage is small in relation to the total number of items in the supply system, the items under these four agencies are responsible for the largest number of individual transactions and for significant dollar value in sales, procurement, and inventory.

Last year four new agencies were set up to handle General Supplies, Construction Supplies, Industrial Supplies, and Automotive Supplies. When they become fully operational, they will boost the total number of items under Single Management to over 700,000. If an integrated management assignment is made for the electrical-electronics commodity—a possibility by press time—integrated management coverage may

well reach 1,200,000 items or about one-third of our present item spectrum.

Estimates of cumulative savings by the Single Managers now range over half a billion dollars dominated by inventory draw-down. Some of this money is now being plowed back in as starting-up costs for the new agencies, but eventually they will amortize this and pay dividends themselves.

It is always possible to achieve economy by compromising efficiency. Such has not been the case with Single Manager operations, however. Their normal rate of effectiveness has been about 95%, and in emergencies they have reacted with a discipline and sense of urgency becoming a military organization.

At the time of the Lebanon crisis the Navy-managed Military Medical Supply Agency met large requirements 100% within 48 hours of demand. To reprovision the fleet, the Military Subsistence Supply Agency made huge deliveries around the clock within hours of the asking. The Military Clothing and Textile Agency delivered Marine Corps last minute requirements right to shipside. MPSA arranged tanker movements 138% of normal, positioned floating reserves in the Mediterranean, and held the line on prices.

Action to support Project Mercury with medical items began within an hour of the Pentagon decision. Requisitions were prepared and financing arranged later. Every item made the deadline.

In July, 1960, the Military Subsistence Supply Agency was called upon to furnish 100,000 rations for the support of U.N. forces in the Congo, a task complicated by the fact that the rations had to be pork-free in order to conform to the dietary laws of the Moslem units in the command.

The call was received on a Friday. By the following Tuesday, the 38 separate items making up the 25-man modules were ready for packaging. Subsequently, MSSA furnished 375,000 more "Congo pork-free rations" on the same basis.


Such a situation is made to order for ADP systems. In responding to the Congo crisis, MSSA put its IBM 650 system to work over the weekend. Requisitions were fed into the computer and edited against stock levels in the various depots. The computer determined the best place to ship from, and prepared shipping orders that were then sent out by transceiver.

The combined use of ADP and a transceiver network has also demonstrated its value at the Military Clothing and Textile Agency. In its first four fiscal years of operation, MC&TSA reduced its inventory from \$1.9 billion to \$1.4 billion. At the same time, its effi-

UNIFORM REQUISITIONING AND ISSUE SYSTEM AREA OF APPLICATION

- SCOPE:**
- 3/4 MILLION DOCUMENTS A DAY BETWEEN CUSTOMER AND WHOLESALE LEVEL
 - DOD-WIDE - FISCAL YEAR 1960
 - UTILIZING 16 DIFFERENT SYSTEMS
(Requisitioning and invoice systems only)

RESULTS:



ciency increased enormously. Supply effectiveness rose from 75% (items shipped on time) to a relatively stable 95%. Unfilled orders, or "dues-out" at MC&TSA dropped from an alarming peak of 40,000 to a level of about 1,000 by the end of fiscal 1960.

Prior to the establishment of MC&TSA, the four Services stored clothing and textiles at 58 locations throughout the country with duplication and overlap of facilities and distribution areas. Material was back-hauled and cross-hauled between depots and customers. Material stores were controlled from 13 separate points.

From the 58 existing facilities, MC&TSA selected 13 as distribution depots and back-up points for mobilization reserve stocks. The number of control points was reduced from 13 to three. A transceiver network was set up linking storage locations and control points with MC&TSA headquarters at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Center.

At Philadelphia, MC&TSA employs an IBM 650 tape-RAMAC system. Operating on a transaction reporting basis, balances affected by each updating are compared with programmed stock levels. If a re-order point has been reached, the computer automatically kicks out a "Supply Control Study" for evaluation and decision. The system also supplies control studies on demand whenever needed by stock analysts in their evaluations.

The lower operating cost of second generation—transistorized—computers has been illustrated in the recent establishment of an ADP system for the Military Construction Supply Agency. In starting up this new Single Manager


Agency at an existing Army inventory control point at Columbus, Ohio, the doubling of supply data-processing workload called for the augmentation of ADP capability. A new Honeywell 800 is being installed to perform the combined missions of the ICP and the Single Manager with a resulting net equipment rental reduction of approximately \$100,000 annually predicted.

To manage an anticipated spectrum of over 100,000 items and \$350,000,000 of inventory on a highly centralized basis, MCSA must rely heavily on ADPS.

All Single Managers employ ADPE of varying manufacture and capability. The Military Automotive Supply Agency, integrated with Ordnance Tank Automotive Command, is programming for a new RCA 501 system to supplement the ADPE used by OTAC for several years. The Military Medical Supply Agency has installed an IBM 1401 which is in full operation covering all major programs. MCSA has just installed a large-scale, transistorized IBM data processing system and MC&TSA plans to put in a comparable installation shortly.

The Military Petroleum Supply Agency, unlike the others, does not have to process a large number of daily transactions. As the world's largest buyer of refined petroleum, however, MPSA has to solve an extremely complex set of variable factors whenever it awards its bulk-procurement contracts. In determining the least-cost bids on some two billion gallons of jet fuel twice a year, for example, MPSA must consider 90,000 variables

(Continued on page 37)



MATS, MSTS, MTMA

Needed: A Single Manager

A single manager controlling military air, land and sea traffic management functions could be the solution to the problems of the huge military transportation operation which now involves three separate single managers; Military Air Transport Service, Military Sea Transport Service, and Military Traffic Management Agency. The following article details some of the problems, and gives the possible solutions.

SOME military planners believe that the three organizations presently handling military air, land and sea transport functions will be (within the next five years) merged under a single manager reporting to the Secretary of Defense or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Before the merger can be accomplished, the barriers of tradition and service rivalry must be hurdled. Presently, many in the services believe they could not function without their godchildren: the Military Air Transport Service (Air Force), the Military Sea Transport (Navy), and the Military Traffic Management Agency (Army).

Probably best qualified to take the other two organizations under its wing would be MTMA since, as its title implies, it is currently assigned the job of "traffic management," although on a smaller scale than would be required to handle all functions.

However, in the course of the proposed reorganization, the original purposes for setting up these agencies shouldn't be lost.

MATS—The Military Air Transport Service was originally set up to (1) maintain an adequate emergency readiness position; (2) carry out realistic training programs; (3) provide airlift service required to all agencies of

by James Lewis

DOD; and (4) provide common user airlift services as required by all agencies of DOD and, (as authorized) for other agencies of the U.S. Government between points in the U.S. and overseas areas, between and within overseas areas, and within the U.S. when necessary for reasons of security or to supplement commercial air carrier service based on determinations by the Military Traffic Management Agency.

MSTS—The Military Sea Transport Service has a mission similar to that of MATS. It is a major component of the U.S. Navy and was established to provide, under one authority, the control, operation and administration of all ocean transportation for DOD. Its three-fold mission is to: (1) provide sea transportation for personnel and cargoes of DOD (excluding personnel and cargoes transported by units of the fleet); (2) plan and negotiate for use of commercial shipping to augment the MSTS nucleus fleet as necessary to meet total requirements; and (3) plan for and be capable of expansion in time of war as directed.

MSTS, like MATS and MTMA, provides service for all DOD agencies. It could be considered the ocean-going

counterpart of MATS except for the fact that MATS draws its personnel, planes and equipment from both Navy and Air Force, whereas MSTS draws solely from the Navy.

MTMA—The Military Traffic Management Agency's mission is to: (1) direct and control all assigned functions of traffic management for all military departments in such a manner as to assure under all conditions, efficiency and economy within DOD in the procurement, use, cost and control of commercial transportation services (including rail, highway, air, inland waterway, coast-wise, and intercoastal and pipeline) required by military agencies for the movement of freight and passengers between points within the U.S.; and (2) develop and execute (when directed by SecDef) emergency plans for the utilization, control and operation of military owned domestic surface transportation resources and such domestic transportation resources and facilities as are allocated or otherwise made available to support military missions under all conditions.

MTMA attributes its success, so far, to the fact that it is jointly staffed at all levels. MTMA personnel are drawn from all services and have worked successfully for the past five

years; successful in that they were opposed from the top down at the start of MTMA.

Organization of the three single managements came about in somewhat the same manner. MATS was formed in 1948 when the World War II Naval Air Transport Service (NATS) and Army's Air Transport Command (ATC) joined forces. Navy still makes up a large part of the MATS operation with about 12 per cent of the men engaged in strategic airlift operations for MATS being Navy men. Navy also contributes a large part of the MATS aircraft fleet.

MSTS was established in August 1949, but inter-service transfer of ships didn't come about until 1950. By November of the same year, 115 Army ships and some 12,000 marine civil service personnel had been transferred to the Navy, supplementing the 92 ships of the ex-Naval Transportation Corps.



MTMA didn't come along until July of 1956. Since its establishment, MTMA has had the responsibility for the effective and economical movement, by commercial carrier, of DOD-sponsored passengers and cargo within the continental U.S.

The organizational structures of the three are much more complicated than the funding systems they work under. Take for example MTMA's reporting chain. It goes something like this: the Executive Director reports through the Army Chief of Transportation, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Logistics before reporting to the Single Manager, Secretary of the Army. Navy and Air Force's chain of command runs a similar course.

The greatest drawback to three different reporting chains is the delaying of ultimate decisions, which contributes a great deal to thwarting the objectives of single managements. Example: MATS Commander Kelly comes upon a crackerjack idea that he thinks would contribute greatly to the overall Defense transportation operation and submits it with the recommendation that it become uniform throughout the Defense establishment. It stands a good possibility of being killed at the Chief of Staff level without ever coming to the attention of the Single Manager, this being the Secretary of the Air Force.

One problem that MTMA is faced with, in view of its chain of command, is that the Department of the Army channels tend to subordinate the logistics systems of the other military services to the Army logistic system making it difficult to follow the basic principle of "responsiveness to the logistics needs of each of the military departments"

(Continued on page 53)



Countering The Sino-Soviet Threat

Political Aspects of a National Strategy

THE DICTIONARY tells us that the primary meaning of political is: "of or pertaining to polity or the conduct of government." The political aspects of national strategy, therefore, cannot be narrowly defined but cover the main aspects of government policy. They include the full array of our purpose and objectives as a nation; the objectives, strategy and tactics of our possible opponents; and the strategy and tactics which it may be appropriate for us to pursue under the dynamically changing circumstances that we must foresee as facing us in the future.

Furthermore, national strategy implies something different from, but more inclusive than, military strategy. It implies the coordinated application of all the various means we have available, economic, diplomatic and psychological, as well as military, in pursuit of our objectives as a nation.

One way to deal with such a subject is to break it up into its principal parts.

What do we see as the basic aims of the United States and more generally of the West?

The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the preamble of the Constitution. It is:

... to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity . . .

The object of our foreign policy and, in turn, of our defense policy derives from that fundamental purpose. It is to promote and secure conditions in the world under which a nation with such purposes as ours can live and prosper. U.S. interests and U.S. security are thus dependent upon the existence, or the creation and maintenance, of some



by Paul H. Nitze

Considered by ARMED FORCES MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE as one of the important Cold War documents, this almost unnoticed article was written by Paul H. Nitze for the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research in December, 1960, just prior to his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs. The article provides an expert analysis of the Communist threat and what our counter-strategy should be, and in doing so spells out what is in essence the Kennedy Administration foreign policy. A campaign advisor to President Kennedy, Nitze headed a group which handed to the President-elect a position paper on foreign policy the day after the election (just prior to the time he wrote this article.) He was instrumental in shaping the Marshall Plan and later Director of the State Department's policy-planning staff.

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form of world order compatible with our values and interests.

During most of our history as a nation this problem did not cause us much concern; such a world order was provided us by other nations. During the long century of relative world peace from 1815 to 1914, we could rely on the balance of power in Europe to give us a high degree of security without much effort on our part. We could devote ourselves primarily to the task of expanding to the Pacific and consolidating our political and economic position at home.

The two world wars shattered all the main elements of that pre-1914 system. Today the central issue of world politics is that of which nation or group of nations will be the builders of a new system of relative world order, a system appropriate to today's world and to the future. The Soviet leaders believe they will be able to construct a new world system satisfactory to themselves. But their system would be wholly incompatible with our development in line with our concept of ourselves as a nation and of our national potential.

We are therefore faced with the responsibility of trying to develop another system compatible with our own purposes and with those of the other non-Communist nations and to defend it from Communist attack or subversion while it is being built. Our job then is to construct while we defend and to defend not only ourselves but, if possible, the entire coalition of non-Soviet controlled nations.

Now, what can be said about Soviet aims and strategy?

It is generally agreed that what threatens us is of a threefold nature. Russia comprises a land mass, resources and a population which would under any circumstances pose a foreign

policy problem. It, and Communist China, are under the control of disciplined totalitarian regimes which would be a problem to us even if the territories and people they controlled were less extensive, endowed with fewer resources, and less populous. In the third place, the Communist world movement comprises an ideology, an apparatus, and a point of view which would be a problem even if it held power over no great nations. In combination, these three elements constitute a most formidable threat.

Most experts have held that the first aim of the Soviet leaders is to maintain firm Communist control over Russia and their individual positions within the Communist leadership; secondly, that they intend to consolidate and protect their control over other portions of the Communist bloc of nations; and thirdly, that they aim to weaken, subvert and eliminate all power centers outside of their control which could conceivably challenge their authority in any significant way.

During most of the period after the Communist seizure of power in 1917, the Soviet leaders felt themselves to be somewhat on the defensive. They knew that they were militarily weaker than the non-Communist world, and they felt insecure in their hold on power internally. Their foreign policy was therefore directed to keeping their potential external enemies divided while they consolidated their hold internally. One of their central doctrinal concepts was that of capitalist encirclement.

The Changing Threat

In recent years their point of view has changed. They appear to have gained greater confidence in their solidity of their internal hold. They have become less concerned about the power of the external non-Communist world. They now talk, not of capitalist encirclement, but of zones of peace. In Russian the word "mir" means not only "peace" but also "the world," so that when the Soviet leaders talk of peace, there is a connotation of peace in a world satisfactory to their purposes.

Many have taken comfort in the idea that some of the original fire behind Communist ideology in Russia has appeared to have burned itself out over the decades since the seizure of power in 1917. I think there is something to this theory, but one must add that while some of the intellectual fire has died down, it has been institutionalized; it has been converted into a vast and powerful bureaucracy that runs with a momentum of its own. The original Communist ideas—the dialectic as a method of thought, class structure and class conflict as a view of politics, and

revolutionary struggle as a means—have all combined to leave a residue in Communist thought patterns which puts a particular emphasis on conflict and the management of conflict. In fact, disciplined organization for the management of conflict can almost be said to have become the supreme effective end of Communism, while economics, culture, internal politics, and even sport have become merely means toward that end.

Red Family Disputes

From the foregoing, it is quite obvious that I see little prospect that the Sino-Soviet leaders will agree to our type of world order—that they will agree that a world order compatible with our purposes is no threat to them and can be accepted by them as a basis for negotiating a comprehensive settlement. I cannot see the Cold War fading away in any such fortunate manner.

The relevant question to my mind is that of the means upon which the Sino-Soviet leaders will probably put primary reliance in the future and the nature of the general strategy which they are likely to pursue.

I think it would be a mistake to view the Communist leadership as homogeneous, unified and acting consistently according to some master plan. Their structure is undoubtedly more highly organized and disciplined than ours. They undoubtedly do put more emphasis upon planning, particularly long range planning, than do we. And they continuously strive to bring their planning and their actions into better coordination, a process which they call the reconciliation of theory and practice.

However, whenever we get a real look into the inner workings of a totalitarian regime we find that the frictions, conflicts and rows about policy and organization are far more intense and bitter than in more democratically organized states. There are few safety valves in the Soviet Union, and the internal pressure builds up very high before there is an explosion or a change.

The events of last May in Moscow and Paris revealed symptoms of divisions over policy and of conflict over personal authority within the Soviet leadership. At Paris Khrushchev seemed to be trying to demonstrate his toughness to his own associates, even more than he seemed to be trying to influence or intimidate the outside world. A serious argument over policy seems to have taken place in Moscow.

Can we have any insight into what the row was about? Not much but perhaps some. One can at least guess

that its origins go back to the shift in Soviet foreign policy which took place at about the time of Stalin's death.

Hans Morgenthau has contended that Khrushchev's foreign policy has differed materially from that of Stalin but that it has nevertheless been as threatening or more threatening to the West.* It can be said that Stalin followed a strategy not too different from the strategy of the Czars. It was a policy directed toward limited gains on the periphery of Russia, to be obtained by a combination of threats, diplomacy, infiltration, and limited military action, while Russia's potential major enemies were to be kept weakened and divided. Khrushchev's strategy appears to have been wider and more global in conception. He now has an economic base of growing strength. He has a modern technology which is able, in chosen fields, to equal ours and occasionally to surpass us. He has a solid military base and, at a minimum, a powerful counterdeterrent in the nuclear field. He is thus in a position to make a play for general prestige, such prestige as would enable him to aspire to general gains rather than to strive for mere bits and pieces on Russia's periphery. If he can succeed in building this level of prestige, he could hope to move the presently uncommitted world over to his side and, simultaneously, to split the Western Alliance itself. If these goals were achieved, he would be well on the road to the establishment of his world order and the destruction of our hopes of building a world order compatible with our interests and purpose.

Soviet Power

Now, let us examine some of the components comprising Soviet power and attempt to estimate how Khrushchev may have been planning to use them. An important component was obviously Soviet military power. I have no doubt that Khrushchev has been striving for what he considered to be superior military power. The relevant question here, however, is whether he believed it feasible and desirable to create what I would call a truly "Class A" nuclear capability: a capability that would allow the Soviets to hope, that by initiating a counter force attack against United States nuclear forces, they could reduce the effects of our retaliatory blow below the limits of what their active and passive defenses could absorb, thereby preventing us from inflicting what they would consider unacceptable damage.

*See his articles, "Soviet Policy and World Conquest," *Current History*, vol. 37, no. 219, November 1959, and "Khrushchev's New Cold War Strategy," *Commentary*, vol. 28, no. 5, November 1959.

The evidence in Khrushchev's speeches and Soviet military journals is inconclusive on the issue of whether he believed such a capability possible. Some of the experts on these matters read it one way, others read it the other way. Whether or not it is in fact feasible for the Soviets to achieve such a military posture depends in part on what they do, in part on what we do, and in part on the future possibilities of science.

My own guess would be that, if we can get through the next two or three years without disaster, and I believe we can, it will then take some extraordinary development in technology or in military doctrine, tactics, training and deployment to make such a Class A nuclear capability possible in the future.

Berlin's Importance

It is much less debatable, however, that Khrushchev believed the Soviets could maintain a secure and powerful counterdeterrent into the indefinite future. In other words, I believe he felt confident that they could deny us a Class A nuclear capability, for they had one great asymmetrical advantage, that of their greater capability for maintaining secrecy of the precise location of their weapon launching sites.

If these were Khrushchev's judgments, he could look forward to a continuation of the Cold War against a military background which would give the Russians a high degree of confidence that, despite very great provocations on their part, we would not initiate an intercontinental nuclear attack which would be an irrational action of desperation for us to undertake under these conditions.

In a conflict below the level of an inter-continental nuclear exchange, I should think that Khrushchev felt Soviet power was reasonably sufficient to meet us or to exceed us at any given level of symmetrical limitation of warfare, except where geographical and political advantages might be highly favorable to us and unfavorable to them.

If this is the military background against which Khrushchev viewed the Cold War, what political strategy and tactics could we expect him to pursue? We have one example in Berlin. I doubt whether Berlin, in itself, is of crucial importance to the Soviet Union. If, however, we and our allies could be humiliated on the Berlin issue, this would go far to increase Soviet prestige and to lower our prestige. It could in fact seriously shake the Western Alliance.

In Berlin, the Russians selected and concentrated on this one particular weak point in the array of our exposed

commitments while putting only relatively light pressure on the other points. With great care they thought through, publicized and reiterated the essential points of their political and psychological campaign in support of their operation. They attempted to foreclose the various rational alternatives which might otherwise have been open to us. They took time and acted prudently to minimize risks and possible accidents.

It would appear that Mr. Khrushchev thought he could play the Berlin situation for a wide variety of possible gains. On the one hand he could use the threat to Berlin to force a series of high level visits and summit meetings which would increase his prestige and respectability as an equal of the great. Secondly, he could use the threat to Berlin to divide the British from the Germans, in which he has been having quite a lot of success, and of dividing the French from the Germans, in which he had less success, and finally of dividing us from the British, the French and the Germans.

Thirdly, I think he hoped to separate the President of the United States from the rest of American leadership in world opinion by suggesting that Mr. Eisenhower was a man of peace who with the American people desired an end to the Cold War, and that it was only the rest of American leadership, both Republican and Democratic, who desired a continuation of the Cold War and continued military preparation against the chance that the Cold War might become hot. He also played on the theme that Mr. Eisenhower and the Executive Branch of Government had lost.

Pressure, Propaganda

After the Camp David meeting, I would guess that he told his associates that he had high hopes that we would eventually agree to some arrangement which would have the effect of turning Berlin over to him without a crisis. After all, the President had acknowledged that the situation of Berlin was "abnormal," and we must know what the Russians meant by that phrase. It inferred that Berlin could only be made "normal" by becoming a part of East Germany.

It should also be pointed out that Khrushchev saw a number of additional points on the periphery of our commitments, against which pressure could be brought to bear, once he had extracted the full measure of potential gains from the Berlin situation.

There are obviously a host of such points. One has only to look hastily at Iraq. There, Kassem, with no strong political organization of his own, is

trying to ride out a balance between various parties and political groups one of which is Communist of an indigenous nationalist stripe, and another Communist of international stripe (that is, taking its orders from Moscow and Peiping). Or one can look at Iran where the Soviet radio keeps up a continuous drum fire of propaganda undermining the Shah's not very progressive and not too popular regime, or at Afghanistan where Soviet economic penetration is strong. Or at India, where in Calcutta, three of the four elected councilmen are now Communists. The rash of student riots have indicated that all is not well in Korea, in Japan or even in Turkey.

In Africa, other possible pressure points appear. Some time ago I spent some time in Guinea with members of Sékou Touré's new government. Touré has organized a strong grass roots political party modeled on Communist organization ideas. Touré would like, I believe, to be independent of Soviet control and direction, but his government is under increasing pressure from the host of East German, Czech, Polish, Bulgarian, Russian, and now Chinese Communist technicians and trade experts who flowed in when the French pulled out.

'Respectable' Subversion

The Belgians have pulled out of the Belgian Congo, leaving the country with no native political leaders with experience in governing.

And developments in Cuba indicate that political pressure points exist even in this hemisphere.

The evolution of Soviet strategy as to situations of this kind is worth mention. In Stalin's day, the principal tool on which the Soviets appeared to rely as the creation of indigenous Communist parties which were eventually to build sufficient organization and strength to seize power from whatever non-Communist government was then in existence. But this approach failed because the established governments all felt that these Communist parties and the Soviet Union which was giving them guidance and support were a threat to their national security. These indigenous Communist parties were checked and controlled and after a time, in most areas, ceased to make much progress.

Just before Stalin's death a new more subtle policy line was adopted. First priority was placed upon the objective of weakening and ousting Western—both European and U. S.—control and influence. All the tools of diplomacy, politics, propaganda and economic relations were to be turned to this objective in collaboration with whatever in-

digenous forces could be found, primarily among non-Communist nationalist forces. The objective of building indigenous Communist parties was to be suppressed or at least postponed.

New Strategy

Among tactics now employed are Soviet bloc offers of economic and military assistance without apparent strings, largely for the purpose of assuring extensive bloc access to the country. Communist propaganda emphasizes those things which will enhance Soviet prestige and in particular Soviet respectability. Soviet economic and technological progress is played up, and the "peace," anti-imperialist, anti-racial or class discriminatory and pro-nationalist issues are stressed.

This new strategy and its tactics appears to be paying better dividends for the Soviet leaders than did the previous strategy and tactics of the Stalinist period. It seems likely that eventually, if and when they succeed in their first objective of eliminating Western control and influence, a goal they have already largely achieved in Guinea and Iraq, they will turn to the nailin down of their own control through the building of Communist parties able to seize power from the then isolated nationalist regimes which will have resulted.

One further element in Khrushchev's strategy and tactics has been his propaganda emphasis on total and complete disarmament as an eventual objective and limited disarmament agreements as preliminaries to that end. This program increased Soviet prestige and respectability among broad ranges of world public opinion. His propaganda campaign along this line was given substantial credibility by the Kremlin's unilateral decision to cut a million and half men out of their armed forces.

That there is not unanimous agreement on the wisdom of Khrushchev's strategy and tactics in the Communist world has long been evident. The Stalinists in the Soviet Communist Party, of whom Suslov seems to be the intellectual leader, have long believed Khrushchev's policies to be too weak and too soft. In particular they have worried that these policies, which include what by Communist standards are liberal ideas, would weaken Communist Party control within the Soviet Union.

The Chinese Communists have long made it evident that they seriously disagree with Khrushchev's strategy and tactics. In contrast to the Soviet Union, their ideological fervor has not burned down; they have not become a relatively rich and prosperous country; they still feel militarily

threatened by the United States. They have advocated a much harder and less subtle line than Khrushchev's.

A third dissident group is the Soviet military, particularly the Army, who have been unhappy about the rapid reduction in military manpower, particularly as it affects the officer corps, flowing from Khrushchev's program and the missilization of the Soviet forces.

I would guess that opposition to certain of Khrushchev's policies began to gain momentum in the Soviet leadership well before the U-2 incident when certain incidents suggested that Khrushchev's earlier hopes were not going to be easy to achieve. Mr. Herter and Mr. Dillon both made speeches indicating we had reconsidered the "abnormality" of Berlin and there seemed to be little possibility that we, deGaulle or even the British would pull the rug out from under the Germans unless we were subjected to very great pressure indeed.

Under the circumstances it is hardly surprising that Khrushchev made much of the U-2 incident. He had known of these flights for many years and presumably would have continued with the summit conference as planned had his antiaircraft not had the good luck to catch this particular U-2 within range. His initial expressions of shock and anger were, therefore, for some purpose. It is my guess that he hoped Mr. Eisenhower would accept the offered bait of disclaiming knowledge of, and responsibility for, the flights and that he, Mr. Khrushchev, would then enter the negotiations under conditions favorable to his getting concessions from the West beyond those which were to be anticipated had the U-2 incident not taken place.

Politics and Defense

Mr. Herter's statement, confirmed by Mr. Eisenhower, not only justified the need for the flights but inferred that they would continue. I believe it was this decision of Mr. Eisenhower not to take the offered bait of disclaiming responsibility which surprised Khrushchev, really angered him, and gave his opponents in the Communist camp at least a temporary leg up. In any case, the summit blew.

The question now before us is what can we expect for the future from Soviet strategy and tactics? I would guess that they have not yet decided themselves exactly what they are going to do. However interesting it would be to eavesdrop today on a meeting of the Soviet Praesidium, I am not sure that we could get a clear view of their future plans than would they of ours, if they were to sit in on a meeting of

our National Security Council.

We must be prepared, in any event, for a somewhat harder, perhaps very much harder, line. If it is the latter, I should think the Soviets would go to some lengths to tone down the transition and not make it look particularly startling. On the other hand, they were on a pretty good wicket in their pre-Summit approach, and I should think they would wish to preserve as many of their previously existing opportunities as possible. It may take them a little time to figure out how to get the best of both worlds.

As for our own strategy and tactics, I should think certain quick fixes are in order. In the first place, the insults we were forced to eat at Paris, which in any other age would have led immediately to war or to dishonor, should spur us to drop the blinders of complacency and to admit that there is a job to be done of considerable magnitude. If it requires a few percent more in the tax rate or a few hours more work at the same pay, these should be no bar to accepting the necessity of the job.

A Misunderstanding

Secondly, we might recognize that the Communists negotiate, as they compete and as they fight, not for agreement, but if at all possible for conclusive success for their side and for their point of view. Furthermore, we should make it clear that not only is a threat with a time limit bad, but a threat with no specific time limit that declares an uncompromisable, definite and aggressive purpose, such as their Berlin threat, is equally bad, to negotiate under such a threat is to negotiate under duress. To negotiate at the summit under duress is imprudent.

Of the broad strategic choices which we have before us now, one of the most important is in the area where political strategy and military strategy meet. This is the area where deterrence policy, general war military strategy, and policy toward the international control and regulation of armaments come together in conflict or in some kind of harmony. At the present time, I believe that they meet in conflict because we haven't thought the problem through and that this conflict is an important source of our difficulties.


The distinction between a policy of deterrence and a general war military strategy is often misunderstood. The first is a peacetime policy; the second is a military strategy which we would put into effect if deterrence fails. If deterrence fails and we are involved in

(Continued on page 51)

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


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
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NATO Forecast

Double Talk Across the Water

If asked, and he's inclined to speak frankly, just about any member of the NATO alliance working in Europe can cite case after case of U.S. "short-sheeting" our allies in NATO armament procurements. Examples:

Among the latest highlights:

1-German Navy tends to buy a French air to ground missile (the AS-20), Luftwaffe has all but said they intend to do the same thing.

When U.S. heard about it, reportedly the American Embassy called German Defense Minister Strauss, asked him "what are you trying to do to us?", insisted he should buy Bullpup instead. Besides the sour sight of seeing government agencies being used to sell weapons, what rankles NATO personnel aware of the situation is that NATO tried to buy Bullpup five years ago, were told by the U.S. they couldn't have it.

French went to work, came up with AS-20 just recently to fill the gap. Now that AS-20 is operational (and reportedly will do all Bullpup will and more) NATO is being told it can have Bullpup after all.

2-Powerful support exists among European NATO members for purchase of Dornier 27 (as a missile support transport aircraft) and French Transal (which even a high official in Army aviation said "I would buy if I could fund the program"). But a handful of USAFE officers with authority, are trying to force a decision in favor of the C-130 which, says at least one NATO technical evaluation paper, would be about equivalent to carrying a sack full of groceries in a dump truck.

3-U.S. government officials have been inordinately proud of announcing for the past year or so how magnanimous they were in placing the F-104 aircraft construction program, in part at least, with European industry.

While the idea, obviously, is sound, the practical translation has left Europe not quite all that elated. Reason: airframe and engine, which is all European industry got a piece of, amounts to only about 40% of the total contract cost. The rest, mostly electronics, has been retained with a tight fist by the U.S. And, even in the airframe and engine parts of the pie, European firms involved reportedly were told, on many components, what companies to buy the raw material, etc., from.

4-During cocktail conversation a manufacturer in perplexed consternation, asked "what is the reason for this rule you have that on any armaments construction program you place in Europe, at least 50% of the total dollars must be spent with U.S. industry?" The Air Force officer he threw the question at had no answer.

In sum: far more of our European allies than the State Department would like to recognize are considerably bitter over the way stated U.S. policy translated into practice runs 180 degrees in the other direction.

NATO Problems Hurt Berlin Stance

Two chinks in NATO's armor as it braces to meet the Berlin crises are:

1—France's trouble with Tunisia over Bizerte: added to the continuing problem with the Algerian rebels, inflicts NATO with embarrassing propaganda as well as an inability to rely on French troops.


2—England's demand that West Germany pay a greater share of the cost of maintaining English troops east of the Rhine. England states she will hold this demand in abeyance while Berlin is threatened, but the dispute brings up the fundamental controversy over mission, roles, and the expense involved within the NATO organization.

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


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His solution is a push-button-operated, coaxial crossbar switching system, using vacuum switches for circuit selection. A typical system consists of 4 transmitter inputs, 7 antenna outputs plus a dummy load, in a 4 x 8 matrix that can be mounted in a 19" rack. It can be controlled locally or remotely over any type of communication network having a bandwidth of at least 200 cycles.

AMF's coaxial crossbar switching system provides 100% flexibility in circuit path selection and accommodates power levels as high as 500,000 watts and frequencies up to 30 megacycles. It allows 100% utilization of all transmitting equipment. Stubs are automatically eliminated.

To insure fail-safe operation, power is required for the vacuum switches *only* during change of condition. Selection rate: 1 per second. Operating transmitters are safety-interlocked to insure a load. There are no hazards from open wires or inadvertent application of power to dead-lined antennas.

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NORAD ON THE ALERT

Inputs from BMEWS Provide Instantaneous Missile Data Direct to NORAD Headquarters

From our vast outer defense perimeter, over thousands of miles, to the nerve center of the North American Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs, the most advanced concept of data handling and checkout is being utilized in the BMEWS system. The stakes are high, for the purpose is defense of the North American Continent.

At BMEWS installations operated by USAF Air Defense Command, computers read out missile tracking data from giant radars. This information is simultaneously relayed to NORAD's Combat Operations Center.

The Radio Corporation of America is prime systems contrac-

tor for BMEWS. At the COC, RCA's Display Information Processor computing equipment automatically evaluates missile sightings, launch sites and target areas. By means of data processing and projection equipment installed by RCA and a team of other electronics manufacturers, the findings are displayed on huge, two-story high map-screens in coded color symbols, providing the NORAD battle staff with an electronic panorama of the North American and Eurasian land masses.


The handling of BMEWS inputs at NORAD is an example of how RCA data processing capabilities are assuring the high degree of reliability so vital to continental defense.

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At NORAD Headquarters, RCA computing equipment, the Display Information Processor (control console shown here), receives sightings data from BMEWS and processes it for automatic readout.



RCA is prime system contractor for the sprawling BMEWS three-site radar network whose probing electronic fingers reach deep into space to provide early warning of missile attacks.



RCA's Automatic Checkout & Monitoring equipment continuously tests and checks performance of portions of the system and alerts an operator when a monitored signal exceeds certain limits.

Out of the defense needs of today a new generation of RCA electronic data processing equipments has been born. For tomorrow's needs RCA offers one of the nation's foremost capabilities in research, design, development and production of data processing equipment for space and missile projects. For information on these and other new RCA scientific developments, write Dept. 434, Defense Electronic Products, Radio Corporation of America, Camden, N. J.



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Newsletter

Armed Forces Management Association
Washington 25, D.C. Phone: ME 8-1071

National President: Lt. Gen. R. C. Wilson, USAF Exec. Vice Pres.: RAdm. Thomas B. Neblett, USN, Ret.

Eighth National Conference Plans

The Eighth National Conference to be held at the Sheraton-Blackstone Hotel in Chicago October 25-26 is making good progress. The Executive Vice President had the pleasure of visiting Chicago and was deeply gratified to note the outstanding arrangements which have been made by National Conference Chairman Mr. John F. Burke, President of the Great Lakes-Chicago Chapter, our host this fall. We are also assured of outstanding cooperation and assistance by the management of the Sheraton-Blackstone.

Our Industries Program Session is assured of presentations by outstanding experts in the fields of management control, electronic data processing and other forward looking management improvement programs. International Business Machines Corporation, Remington Rand-Univac, General Precision, Operations Research, Inc. and System Development Corporation are sending top officials as our guest speakers. It is also expected that Armour Research Foundation of the Illinois Institute of Technology will participate.

Greater emphasis is being placed upon chapter work shops and "Management Ideas from the Field." Lieutenant General Emerson L. Cummings, Commanding General Fifth U.S. Army, will deliver the address of welcome. The Educational Program Session, the Department of Defense program and the National Awards Banquet promise distinguished guest speakers with messages of importance to the membership and our industry associates.

Chapter Briefs

On 15 June NAS Jacksonville Chapter No. 40 was officially chartered by the National President.

With eighty-three Charter Members, under the leadership of Captain J. R. Reedy, USN, commanding the Naval Air Station, this chapter is cordially welcomed to the Association with all best wishes for a highly successful and professionally profitable operation.

Great Lakes-Chicago Chapter No. 32 enjoyed an excellent attendance of 89 persons at their 14 June meeting. Featured speaker was Lt. General David W. Traub, Comptroller of the Army. Officers for the current year are: Presi-

dent—Mr. John F. Burke, Vice President—Captain B. O. Roessler, Secretary—Teresa H. Parenti, Treasurer—Mr. Don L. Stanford, Councilors—Mr. Lyle Lenhart (Army), Mr. Robert V. Smith (Navy), Eleanor Luby (Navy), Shyrle Altemus (Navy).

Hawaii Chapter No. 18 announces the election of officers for 1962: President—Jule M. Kirk, V. P. LCdr. Otto F. Unsinn, USCG, Secretary-Treasurer—Captain James A. Webb, Jr., USAF, Directors—Messrs. Earl N. Tennyson, Jack H. Reeves, Marshall Shores.

National Headquarters wishes to commend the outgoing chapter officers for the past year's excellent work and to wish every success to the newly elected officials who have taken on these demanding, but highly rewarding responsibilities dedicated to the advancement of management improvement.

Chapter President Promoted—Captain James R. Reedy, USN, founder and first president of our new NAS Jacksonville Chapter 40 has been selected for promotion to Rear Admiral and will be taking command at sea in the near future. National Headquarters extends heartiest congratulations to this outstanding officer and wishes him all success in this most important phase of his naval career.

Election of National Officers—The Nominating Committee of the National Board of Directors has submitted to the membership a slate of distinguished nominees to serve as National Officers and Directors. All members are requested to complete and return their ballots at the earliest practicable date.

National Conference Exhibits

Quite a number of our exhibit spaces at the Sheraton-Blackstone have been taken by industry. Allowing for the Department of Defense exhibits, there are still a few spaces available. It is urged that our industry associates who may desire to exhibit at this Conference make their reservations as soon as possible. Request for exhibit spaces should be addressed to: Mr. John F. Burke, AFMA Conference Chairman, Fifth Army Headquarters, Chicago 15, Illinois.

Thomas Blubert

The 1961 Fall National Conference

The Fall national conference will be held at the Sheraton Blackstone Hotel in Chicago during the period 25, 26 October, 1961, and will be sponsored by the Great Lakes-Chicago Chapter of the Association.

Keynote of the fall meeting will be, "Good Management is Everybody's Business."

As in the past, this meeting will feature presentations by top-flight speakers in all fields of management interest.

ARMED FORCES MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION Washington 25, D. C.	
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
New Technical Bulletin 204 gives details on Denison "Advanced Hydraulic Components For Ground Support Equipment". Write for your copy.

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What will the Surveyor find on the moon?

Sometime in 1963, this spacecraft will land on the moon. In it will be over 200 pounds of scientific instruments designed to gather, analyze and transmit information about the moon's surface, subsurface and atmosphere.

The Hughes-designed Surveyor will be built to "soft land." As it approaches the moon, after a 66-hour flight from the earth, retro-rockets will be fired to cushion the impact of landing.

Then, standing on three legs, the 750-pound moon explorer will set to work—as scientists here on earth watch via television. High-quality television pictures of the lunar landscape will be taken and transmitted. Drills will pierce the moon's surface and samples will be brought up into the spacecraft for chemical analyses. Other instruments will measure the geo-physical characteristics of the lunar surface, as well as the moon's magnetic and radiation fields.

Hughes will build seven Surveyor vehicles which are scheduled to be launched at Cape Canaveral during the period 1963-66. The work is being performed for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Technical direction is by the California Institute of Technology Jet Propulsion Laboratory.

The information which Surveyor gives us will be an important step toward the day when man himself will stand on the moon and look out into the universe.

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Single Managers

(Continued from page 19)

such as unit price, method of transportation, distance, destination, terminal capacity, small business priorities, and many other factors.

This formerly required seven weeks of manual computation. By redesigning its management system and adopting linear programming to apply the variables properly, MPSA has been able to shift a major portion of its evaluation workload to a combination IBM 704/7090 system. This has shaved two weeks off the evaluation operation. Savings due to the increased accuracy of the program are expected to come to \$5 million a year.

MSSA is also studying the application of linear programming and computer evaluation to the myriad of variables which complicate subsistence procurement.

The Military Industrial Supply Agency will eventually manage 480,000 line items. To assist in this staggering management job, the agency will employ RCA ADP equipment. By adapting the format of its catalog to the read-out of an RCA 501, MISA, among other things, saves a half railroad carload of paper when it goes to press.

Impressive as these savings in time and money may be, the ease with which Single Manager operations lend themselves to modern ADP techniques has paid other dividends that may, in the long run, be more important than dollars and cents savings. As one agency spokesman pointed out recently, "Top level supervisors can now devote more time to the development of better management decisions instead of massaging papers and computing statistics."

Already the results are beginning to show. "Phantom numbers"—line items with no demand, no stock, and no history of either have been spotted and eliminated. Commonality of usage among the four services has been increasing. For example, before MC&TSA was established only about 14% of the clothing and textile items were in common use. MC&TSA has more than doubled this percentage and has reduced its item range 18% at the same time. MISA recently secured service agreement to standardize on paints and to eliminate 24% of the paint items from this system. MCSA, meanwhile, eliminated 72% of the items in one of its Federal classes.

Next July two standardization developments will go into effect that will further extend the capabilities of the Single Manager ADP systems. First is a standard priority system that will replace the separate priority classifica-

tions now used by the individual services. Second, and more revolutionary, is a uniform requisition system. The sixteen present systems by which DOD's estimated 750,000 transactions per day are handled will be reduced to two standard systems—a requisition system and a shipping invoice system.

The uniform requisition system, and other uniform methods now under development, will certainly hasten the day when computer talks to computer and ADP systems take over more and more of the routine responsibilities of our complex supply organization. As a step in this direction, a Rapid Data Transmission System has been in operation between the Armed Forces Supply Support Center and all major Inventory Control Points since 1959. At present, improvements are underway with the first installation of the IBM 1944 paper tape transceiver.

Future Trends

These developments are an encouraging beginning to a huge task still ahead. The requirements of military readiness—far more urgently than the dictates of economics—demand greater integration, cohesion, continuity, and compatibility in our supply system if it is to satisfy the criteria of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and be immediately responsive to all our military forces world-wide. More comprehensive and cohesive emphasis on integrated system design is needed in high priority, particularly at the Inventory Control Point level. Common data elements, code structures, terms and procedure are needed to facilitate communications among the elements of our system and between the system and supported forces. Supply and financial procedures must be simplified and brought into consonance. Computers must talk to computers across service, command, commodity, and functional barriers with less reaction and lead time.

By the time this article appears, the Secretary of Defense may have made a decision as a result of "Project 100" which will consign the Single Manager plan to the archives as another passing episode in the chronology of logistics unification. Single Managers may be superseded eventually by a Defense Supply Agency, a Joint Logistics Command, a Fourth—or as the Marines prefer to say—a Fifth Service.

Or they may be given a new lease on life with greater emphasis on unified system design. It is not appropriate to discuss the merits of these alternatives here. Whatever the outcome of Project 100, the progress made by Single Managers will be preserved and built upon. Their contribution toward a responsive, compatible integrated supply system has been substantial. ■

Electronics is our business. Imaginative pioneering in advanced electronics by more than 5,000 Hughes engineers and scientists is speeding man's progress in a host of new ways—with revolutionary 3-dimensional radar systems, with ion engines to take man on long space journeys, with computers that can do years of work in hours. Such creative efforts have helped build Hughes into one of the world's most important producers of electronic systems and products.

European Early Warning . . .

The Key to NATO's Air Defense

Our European NATO Allies must defend a four thousand mile border on their one yard line. How effective the NATO early warning and air defense system is could spell victory or defeat.

by Colonel Kent K. Parrot

SPEAKING in football parlance, our European NATO Allies are trying—without integration of their forces until war starts—to defend a four thousand mile goal line on their one yard line.

They are trying to build a defense primarily against the piloted bomber . . . when missiles are becoming a greater threat everyday.

They are trying to build a defense oriented eastwards while Soviet missile launching submarines can attack from the West—can “end run” any land based system—and NATO forces are caught in the squeeze between the Iron Curtain and the sea.

These are only a few problems, and within the constricted geography of Europe, there is no adequate solution. A wider frame of reference—one which ties North America and Europe together—is essential if solutions are to be found.

Air defense is generally thought of in terms of destroying enemy bombers or missiles before they reach their objectives. This is one air defense job. There are others. Broadly speaking, air defense activities can be grouped under the following headings: (1) prevention of surprise; i.e., air warning system; (2) active air defense, that is, destroying enemy bombers or missiles; (3) passive air defense,—those measures concerned with minimizing the damage caused by such enemy weapons as reach the target: construction of bomb proof shelters, dispersal of targets, protection of civilian populations, etc.

In point of time, the activities under (1) play their most important role during transition from peace to war; once hostilities commence their importance diminishes and activities under (2) and (3) become more critical.

Of the three elements, there is no question as to the one most feared by any potential aggressor; it is the first—warning—because the second, active air defense, cannot seriously block



Surrounded on all sides by Soviet offensive forces, the problem of air defense for European countries and the NATO forces defending them is one of the most complex problems facing the West. The system must perform the almost impossible duty of destroying incoming nuclear weapons, insure that the West's defensive forces are alerted and that industry, combat and retaliatory strike forces are impaled so that their survival can insure eventual victory. The effectiveness of the NATO air defense system may decide whether U.S. forces are alerted in time to be effective.

strong offensive air power in Europe today.

But warning cancels out the advantages of surprise. It gets the strike forces of the Free World off the ground and insures retaliation. On the premise that suicide is not a very popular pastime, a planned all out attack is unlikely if surprise is impossible—or questionable.

Some of the difficulties of active air defense in Europe have already been mentioned, but the list has not been exhausted. In Europe, for example, it would be easy for attacks to come from the East at low altitudes and not be detected until too late because of the very short distance of many targets from the Iron Curtain. Radar is "line of sight" limited; that is to say, it cannot look around the curvature of the earth (though new developments may make this possible).

If an attack is coming in at very low altitude, radars presently in use in Europe will not pick it up until the attacking aircraft are within forty to fifty miles of the station, even though, at higher altitudes, the radar may be able to see aircraft one hundred to two hundred miles away. At the speeds of today, fifty miles doesn't provide much time to direct interceptors and missiles at the targets.

Surprise Attack

Identification of friend or foe (IFF) presents another problem. At today's speeds and distances it is sometimes extremely difficult to know whether the return "blips" on a radar scope represent friendly or hostile aircraft—and decisions must be taken in a matter of seconds.

When imagining the general melee in the skies over Europe with the coming of war—hostile and friendly interceptors and bombers plus a sprinkling of remotely controlled missiles—one can well question whether Europe's active air defense could operate effectively on the score of the IFF problem alone.

However, there is still a final basic problem: the equipment on the ground required to "aim" air defense weapons (called "electronic ground environment"). It consists of the radars, communications, plotting rooms, computers and related equipment. It must handle large quantities of data rapidly and accurately as contrasted with early warning systems which need only handle small quantities of information. In effect, the "electronic ground environment" and the organization that mans it is the "sight" for the high speed interceptors and surface-to-air missiles of today.

But Europe has an outmoded "ground environment" by today's

standards. It will be some time before it is improved with modern communications and high speed computer techniques. When one speculates on what a few well directed missiles, plus a little sabotage, might do to even a modern electronic ground environment system, one cannot help but wonder how long it would be effective even were it perfect to start with.

So of the three air defense areas, active air defense poses the greatest problems. Warning systems against surprise attack, on the other hand, are comparatively simple and, it can be argued, return the biggest dividend. Though they must act rapidly, they do not have to process the quantities of information required to aim weapons against targets changing position at sonic and supersonic speeds.

Surprise is a weapon as old as time. The Greek general Niceas used it successfully in his campaigns in Sicily during the fifth century, B.C.; the Japanese used it at Pearl Harbor some 2400 years later.

But it is not an unchanging weapon; because of the vastly increased power of weapons and the large increase in speed of weapon delivery systems, the power and danger of surprise attack has been immensely increased. So much so that nations, aware of the fear engendered on both sides of the Iron Curtain by the possibilities of surprise attack, are beginning to explore ways of reducing the danger of surprise—on the supposition that, were the hope of achieving surprise reduced, or eliminated, no nation would dare precipitate a major conflict today.

This is tacit admission of the power of the weapon of surprise in 1961. Yesterday it could win a battle; tomorrow it may win a war.

Surprise involves secrecy and, generally speaking, democracies are always at a disadvantage in this regard as compared to totalitarian governments. Add to this the special Russian

fetish for secrecy and the danger becomes larger.

It is noteworthy also that in recent years Soviet military doctrine has given more attention to the element of surprise in warfare. Soviet military writers have pointed out that the destructive power of modern weapons gives this factor much greater importance than it ever had before.

But in order to achieve *effective* surprise, the Soviets have quite a few problems of their own, some of which are even more difficult than those faced by Western air defense planners.

This is because all the natural and technological factors which, for a time, gave Russia a virtual monopoly of secrecy—and surprise—are gradually melting away. Today, to be effective, a surprise attack must be carefully coordinated and achieved on a wide scale and over a wide area. Otherwise, a successful surprise attack in one local area only serves to alert the rest of the Free World; it becomes "early warning" and not surprise at all in the broadest sense.

The very same advances in physical sciences that have vastly increased the destructive potential of surprise have also increased the difficulties of achieving it. Modern development of a wide range of detection systems means that, on balance, a natural Soviet advantage vis-a-vis the West is shrinking.

It is true that one or another of the new detection systems can be countered by the Soviets—they are not invulnerable in themselves—but as these systems develop and multiply, it becomes more and more improbable that they all become inoperative at the same time. This puts an ever increasing strain on the Soviets to know definitely how their highly valued secrecy stands at any given instant.

The random nature of many physical phenomena affecting detection augments the factor of uncertainty. As detection systems increase in variety, the



The Defense Early Warning (DEW) Line serves as the Free World's defense against surprise air attack across the North Pole.

element of risk for the Soviets in attempting surprise attack will grow. This applies to attack with missiles as well as with piloted aircraft.

Surprise attack in the ballistic missile age is often thought of as just about as simple as lighting so many fuzes on Fourth of July rockets at the same instant . . . but the record of our own difficulties at Cape Canaveral and the long silences between successful launchings on the Soviet side, indicate that the achievement of an effective surprise attack, even in the ballistic missile era, may not be as easy as it is sometimes pictured. Here again, a premature launching, a missile that goes in the wrong direction, or an attack which is not completely coordinated because of technical or organizational difficulties could alert the West, provided the Western warning systems were closely integrated over as wide a sweep of geography as possible, thereby taking maximum advantage of the inherent difficulties in launching a massive surprise attack.

To insure that Soviet chances for achieving effective surprise become minimal, improvements in the European warning systems against both aircraft and missile attack, and a close interlocking of North American and European detection systems is essential.

If we examine this area, we find that millions of dollars have been spent building and improving North American warning systems—sizeable sums on interceptors and missiles for Europe—but too little on European warning and the integration of European warning systems with ours. Within North America, warning systems are working in the area of diminishing returns. Within Europe, warning system development still has far to go. Yet, the very concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization rests in an important way on the instantaneous operation of warning. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty state that an attack against one is an attack against all. This has minimized the possibility of fighting a limited war in the NATO area. Should a major conflict be in the making, it is of supreme importance that all the free world's forces be instantly alerted; this is in the basic NATO structure.

Second Thoughts

Warning systems generally aren't as spectacular as interceptor aircraft or surface-to-air missiles and, possibly for this reason, they haven't been given their due attention in Europe. They work quietly—they aren't so widely understood. On the other hand, should there be a major conflict within the next several years, not even the most

hopeful optimist would predict a very high kill rate for European active air defense systems. This doesn't mean that they shouldn't continue to be improved, but it does mean that first things should be done first and funds allocated in proportion to the importance of the results expected.

Europe is like a man bent backwards over the muzzle of a gun, should the trigger be pulled, there isn't enough time to intercept the projectile, the only hope is to destroy the gun.

There recently have been second thoughts in the United States as to how much money should be spent on active air defense against the piloted bomber. If it proves difficult within a single technically advanced country to match the rate of change of the air threat, it is an order of magnitude more difficult in an alliance which, by its nature and in its parts, falls further behind the rapidly changing threat.

But think what could be done in the field of warning—with the money required to procure, operate and maintain a few squadrons of aircraft and missiles. Think of the relative contribution of these two air defense elements should war occur; adequate warning could insure survival and victory; whereas air defense weapons could destroy only a small percentage of the attacking force—a somewhat academic contribution in nuclear war.

It is interesting to note that both in Europe and in the United States, the deterrent retaliatory forces give warning as their first priority requirement. The air defense organizations which service them in this regard serve two masters and inevitably look upon warning as just one of many problems of which active air defense is by far the greatest and most difficult. Therefore, though warning receives "high priority" words, it does not always receive high priority action. This is particularly true in Europe with the efforts being made to tie European and North American warning systems together. What is needed is more emphasis, more sense of urgency—and the requisite reallocation of funds.

What does European air defense have to do with the air defense of the United States? If warning can be obtained from Europe, it may have a great deal to do with it. Of course, the general consensus is that the Soviets would attempt to strike the retaliatory forces within the United States first—but history proves, if it proves nothing else, that the accepted pattern for the other side to follow is, in fact, rarely followed.

We are presently in the "missile gap" period when the Soviets may have more missiles than we and when our retaliatory forces may be dangerously

vulnerable to Soviet attack. But adequate warning immediately provides our forces with a strong element of invulnerability; if they cannot be caught on the ground and destroyed.

The Best Solution

Warning from Europe of Soviet bomber or missile attack might be the key to U. S. survival in the future.

What is required to improve European detection systems and integrate these systems with ours? One fundamental need is a group of scientists and technicians looking over the whole European warning system and conversant also with comparable systems in North America.

Fortunately, such a group already exists. At a place called the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center (SADTC) located at the Hague in Holland, a group of scientists gathered from thirteen NATO nations have been working on the problem for a number of years with much accomplished.

At the time SADTC was established as one of the projects supported by the United States Mutual Weapons Development Program, it was felt that though several NATO Nations possessed large defense-science resources, these were being applied in so small a geographical frame of reference that even a partial solution of the air defense problem was made practically impossible. Related to this was the fact that certain problems were not being studied, not because they were particularly difficult, but simply because they extended beyond national boundaries and no international technical agency existed to solve them.

SADTC has grown gradually in strength from the day in February, 1955 when it opened its doors with a staff of 5 people, to today's strength of several hundred. True, the warning problem itself is just one of many faced by the Technical Center, but given the funds and the priority, SADTC has the knowhow and the capacity to build an integrated European early warning system—against both bomber and missile attack—and tie this system effectively into the North American net.

All types of air defense make their contribution to deterrence: warning, active defense, and passive defense. But in the world of today the early warning systems—which by and large are the cheapest—make the greatest. They help to stabilize the military situation. By blocking the chance for surprise and insuring retaliation they remove the temptation to attack. They are the trigger to the Free World's deterrent strength which lies not in defense, but in the power to strike. ■



Research Rundown

Admirals Outranked Again

President Kennedy's recent recommendation that Congress give Special Project's Technical Director Capt. Levering Smith a spot promotion to Rear Admiral indicates that many of the Navy's senior Admirals didn't learn their lesson in the Rickover affair.

Again the Commander in Chief has had to overrule the Admirals in their narrow selection process and recognize the qualifications of a technically qualified officer for flag rank.

As one high Navy official put it, "there is nothing more important to the future success of government-industry work on the problems of weapon system development than recognition of talented technical officers for their importance on the government side of this relationship. And as the Navy moves towards a nuclear powered, electronically controlled missile Navy, the retention of technically qualified officers becomes essential."

Reds Ahead In Military Space?

The nation's most prominent advocate of a military space program is again warning that the Soviet Union is way out in front of the U.S. in its effort to achieve military domination of space. Dr. Walter R. Dornberger, head of the German rocket effort during World War II and presently Vice President and Chief Scientist of Bell Aerosystems Co. stated recently "the Soviet space program has marched toward developing the capability of placing large military spacecraft in orbit and establishing military bases on the moon. Scientific gains that did not contribute to this program have been purely secondary."

Hopes Rise For Nike-Zeus

Recent tests have encouraged the Nike-Zeus team that they can perfect their weapon in time to be considered a major tool in the U.S. defense system. Recently the missile performed satisfactorily over an extended range, maneuvering in response to control orders issued by its command guidance system on the ground.

B-70 Still A Limper

For a program which is supposed to have been pushed back into the laboratory, the B-70 bomber is still churning out volumes of smoke and fire.

But for all the furor, informed observers are convinced Defense Secretary McNamara is not going to knuckle under to heavy pressures (from Congress, the Air Force, the aircraft industry) to put the program back into a full scale production effort.

In spite of Berlin, in spite of the wide spread Pentagon suspicion that we *do* need a manned aircraft of sorts—and there's nothing else going, key high level strategists are convinced the program is suspect.

Among the *military* reasons:

- 1—it is a one-trip weapon whose retaliatory job can be done far cheaper by ICBM's;
- 2—it is at least twice as vulnerable as the B-52 to missile attack "which means twice as gloomy as absolute gloom, if that's possible;"
- 3—it is a poor design for the only powerplant which would make it sensible—ANP;
- 4—and this costlier-than-gold weapon system is a cinch to be obsolete by the time it would be in production—even on a crash basis.

"**Problem**," summed up one general (Air Force), "is that a great many people are still trying to build tomorrow's weapons using yesterday's concepts of warfare."

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Since tracking beams can be positioned in a *fraction of a microsecond*, it is possible to track a great many targets while continuously searching for additional missile threats. And because phased array radar beams are electronically steered, the antennas do not rotate; and there is no chance for mechanical failure.

Major advances such as phased array radar are typical of the work being done by the scientists and engineers of the entire General Telephone & Electronics corporate family. The vast communications and electronics capabilities of GT&E, directed through Sylvania Electronic Systems, can research, design, produce, install and service complete systems. These include the entire range from detection and tracking, electronic warfare, intelligence and reconnaissance through communications, data processing and display.

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
CHEMICALS / Oldest nuclear fuel supplier. Formerly Mallinckrodt Nuclear. Facilities at St. Louis and Hematite, Missouri.

DEVELOPMENT / Oldest commercial independent nuclear R & D organization. Formerly NDA. Facilities at White Plains, Eastview and Pawling, N. Y., and Stamford, Conn. (Ray Proof Corp., a subsidiary).


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
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Collins Loran C Receiving System, military nomenclature AN/SPN-30, was developed for the U. S. Coast Guard and is another example of Collins advanced R&D which covers the electronics spectrum. For details on Collins Loran C or R&D, contact Collins Radio Company, Texas Division Sales.



Flexible, world-wide network now speeds launching and tracking data, administrative messages, computations in seconds and in writing.

NASA chooses Western Union-engineered system for world-wide satellite tracking stations and computer centers

The world over, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Minitrack Stations remain operational around the clock. Their mission: to pick up satellite tracking intelligence and transmit it instantaneously to NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center in Maryland.

Now, every NASA Minitrack Station can transmit direct to the Maryland Center—or use this point as a relay for messages between individual stations. Equally important: Maryland can send launching and tracking intelligence simultaneously to NASA installations around the globe.

"Conference Circuits" are another unique feature of this system. With push-button ease and speed, Minitrack Stations on opposite sides of the world can now "talk" to each other in writing.

Every NASA message is automatically numbered before transmission. No chance of loss or error. And monitoring equipment assures continuous maintenance of all circuits.

Where fast, modern communications are needed to speed information without delay, without error, without fail . . . new Western Union systems are meeting the challenge.

WESTERN UNION . . . finds better ways to speed it electronically

Reserve Officer Hiring: Unfair?

The following unsigned comment is representative of many letters received recently from civil servants working at military bases in resort areas. They charge that retired reserve officers are being favored for civil service jobs, allowing them to "retire with pay" amidst comfortable climate and surroundings. DoD and Air Force officials reply that only 5,000 out of over a million Defense civil servants even fit the category in all services. Major reason for the numerous complaints, according to AF sources, are that changing demands of military technology sometimes require skills possessed by retired reserve officers and not possessed by certain presently employed civil servants, and that inflexible employment regulations sometimes force commanders to release a civil servant in order to hire someone (who may or may not be a retired reserve officer) who has the needed experience or skills. ARMED FORCES MANAGEMENT MAGAZINE reprints this comment because it represents the feelings of many civil servants, and at the very least indicates a demoralizing lack of communication on the part of the military in this area.



"THE FUTURE holds the same degree of challenge and promise for civilian members of the Armed Forces team. It offers an exciting and demanding prospect for higher level job responsibilities, with better career opportunities, and a more satisfying and productive working environment." (USAF Personnel Policy)

THERE IS an exclusive retired Reserve Officers' Club at Patrick Air Force Base (Cape Canaveral) with the mysterious symbol "AFMTC." It is so exclusive that the Air Force pays the members up to \$15,000 per year for the honor of their presence. Fringe benefits include PX and other privileges in addition to retirement pay and Government salary. (Reserve Officers with retirement pay are not subject to the Dual Compensation Law which limits "Regular" officers to \$10,000 combined retirement pay and Government salary.)*

The matter-of-fact extent to which Civil Service Regulations and the Civil Service Career Development Program are circumvented is a mockery. Reserve Officers (without Civil Service Status) in uniform one day, retire and report to Civil Service positions in complete disregard to competitive opportunity for Career Civil Service Employees. These same "select" individuals peculiarly meet all qualifications for rapid promotion to high paying positions (many of which are magnificent magnifications of routine paper shuf-

fling). A university degree has less worth than a 3-weeks "Air Force" training course and private industry experience has no value at all!

The non-military Civil Servant knows that protest would lead to recrimination—there is an insulation of layers of officers in chain-of-command; and civilian appeal devices are distorted and staffed with the very individuals who are benefactees of the system. The whole structure is self-serving, and the steady exodus of disillusioned, highly competent, non-military civilian employees results in further solidification of the select cadre, paving the way for further ingress and upgrading of their empires.


Even the Director of Civilian Personnel at AFMTC, who was just awarded another meritorious citation, is a Retired Reserve Colonel, Infantry.

The blase' individual no longer quips, "Where is the body buried?", but rather, "You'd think the aroma would reach Washington." Perhaps these personnel practices have become so commonplace throughout the United States that the situation is comparable to the man who worked on a garbage truck who, when asked, "How can you stand that smell?", replied, "What smell?"

* According to Pentagon lawyers, both Regulars and Reserves are limited to \$10,000 but, through another statute, Regulars are also bound by a law which limits the yearly salary to no more than \$2500.

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The RD-900 Random Access Storage and Display System, consists of from 1 to 33 high density, magnetic, file drums, each with a storage capacity of 15 million bits. A Symbol Generator converts coded characters

into a visual message as fast as they are read from the file. One Symbol Generator is used to drive any number of output display devices. These include 21" console displays and large screen projection displays . . . each capable of displaying up to 12,800 characters, symbols or a composite of both. In addition to alphanumeric characters the system can display arbitrary or abstract symbols, schematic or logical drawings, graphs, charts, and maps. Applications include military and industrial systems where information retrieval and display must be simultaneous for instant decision making. For a complete description and specifications write Dept. 101.



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Procurement Trends

Spare Parts Still a Snag

Over a year ago, AFM noted that the problem of spare parts for aircraft in Europe was becoming a monumental headache. There weren't enough. Progress report: the problem is worse, not better.

Difficulty started with the Eisenhower policy of under-buying spares on initial aircraft procurements (to save money), has been aggravated by the fact that many of these operational aircraft in Europe today are no longer production items in U.S. industry. Crisis reportedly is particularly ominous in the aircraft engine business.

Army to Hike Air, Missile Procurement

The Army will spend \$36.7-million more for aircraft and \$33.77-million more for missiles in FY 1962 than they did in FY 1961. Total aircraft procurement will be \$248-million and total missile procurement \$585-million.

Most of the new missile money will be for field type weapons. The new aircraft obligations will be for combat support aircraft of limited transport, surveillance and other types which will be used as integral parts of combat divisions.

Background: The Army is attempting to replace aircraft produced hurriedly under World War II and Korean War pressures in a changing military situation. Following the prescription of a 10-year modernization program announced recently, the Army will reduce the number of helicopter and fixed wing models from 11 to 6; and standardize the fuel used by all Army aircraft. Over 75 percent of all Army aircraft by 1970 will be helicopters.

Single Managers on Way Out?

The single managers in DOD's service supply operations may be merged into what eventually will amount to a Defense Supply Agency, a Joint Logistics Command, a Fourth—or as the Marines prefer to say—a Fifth Service. (See Single Managers story, p. 18.)

Unification of the supply single managers will be the result of greater use of computers and a more streamlined DOD organizational structure.

The trio of single managers handling MATS, MSTS, and MTMA may also be merged into a single service-type agency. (See "Needed: A Single Manager," p. 20). Here all traffic management functions would be handled by one agency, combining air, land and sea services.

Berlin Crisis Effects DOD Economy


Unlike previous threats to national security, the Berlin crises has meant that many DOD and service units have had to economize.

Reason: In order to achieve what Paul Nitze in this issue describes as a Class "A" defense with the additional funds received, McNamara has moved to insure that the nation receives the "most bang for a buck," requiring administrative and support agencies to do more with the same staffs, budgets.

Mixed Force' Still Desired

Manned aircraft will be needed for many years to come. This was the gist of secret testimony by DOD Research and Engineering chief Dr. Harold Brown before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee recently. According to Chairman John Stennis (D-Miss.), Brown's remarks on the nation's strategic striking power indicates that a mixed force of aircraft and missiles still is "fundamental and essential to a strong defense position."

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National Strategy

(Continued from page 25)

a general war, I can see no reasonable aim for our military strategy other than substantially to disarm the enemy while preserving our own essential core as a nation capable of exercising policy and thereby leaving the enemy no practical chance but to accommodate himself to our political will. Obviously a rational military strategy presupposes that we have a political will and have some ideas as to what our postwar aims would be. On the other hand, the aim of a policy of deterrence is to make it unlikely that we shall ever have to put our military strategy to the test. And thirdly, the aim of a policy looking toward mutual control and regulation of armaments is to make mutual deterrence more reliable, stable and secure.

What military posture do we need to support these aims? To support a rational general military war strategy, we would need superior reconnaissance and target acquisition system, powerful and accurate counterforce attack systems, active defense, passive defense, as well as effective recuperation measures. These would need to be supported by a secure second-strike capability to reduce the risk of being outflanked by an enemy preemptive strike. All these should be supported by limited war forces capable of dealing with less than all-out threats.

Some have argued that all that is required to support a policy of deterrence is a secure second-strike capability, directed particularly against soft city targets, and strong limited war forces to field threats other than a direct attack on the United States.

Today, we seem to be putting primary emphasis upon assuring ourselves of such a secure second strike capability. By 1963 or 1964 we should, with Polaris submarines, Minutemen, Skybolts, etc., have a pretty secure

and impressive capability of that type. But there is little prospect that our military posture in support of a rational military strategy, should deterrence fail, will have improved much, if at all, by that time.

It is highly unlikely that we will have the necessary passive and active defense measures to enable a sufficient core of our nation to survive and to recuperate, or that our target acquisition and attack systems will have sufficient performance adequately to do the counterforce disarming job. Against a determined enemy fully abreast of modern technology controlling a great expanse of territory, and maintaining a high degree of secrecy, a true Class A capability may not be feasible without some now unforeseen technological breakthrough.

Three Choices

A Class B posture, a posture from which one can retaliate but cannot hope to disarm the enemy is by itself, not a very solid foundation for our political aims. There would be little rational purpose to be served by its use. If we ever have to use it, the purpose for which it was created will have failed. I think the psychological foundation of a policy of deterrence is sound, but it includes the assumption that the Soviet leaders will be controlled by rational considerations. And one of those rational considerations must be a Russian judgment that we are capable of acting irrationally if attacked. I rather suspect that if we rely merely on a Class B capability the Russians may be able to test our resolution piecemeal and over time in such a way that our response might be quite different from the expected response to a sudden attack.

Let us assume we are relying on a mixed system of Polaris submarines, Minutemen and airborne Skybolts for an important component of our secure deterrent. What would then be our

proper response if four Polaris submarines failed to report and we suspected Russian action, or if ten Minuteman installations in Alaska were sabotaged? All-out retaliation would be suicidal, while the ins and outs of limited reprisal are far from clear. In any case, a Class B nuclear capability gives little support against limited war threats and little assurance that we can protect the particular limits within which we might choose to fight a limited war against expansion to some other level by the other side.

If a Class A capability seems to be unfeasible or impracticable within probable politico-economic limitations on the resources we can call on for the purpose, and if also a Class B capability seems dangerous and unsatisfactory, it is quite natural that people should turn increasingly to the search for some third solution.

Obviously the third solution under most active consideration is the control and regulation of armaments or, in the phrase now used, disarmament.

In April I was in Geneva and observed some of the discussion between the five Western delegations and the five Communist delegations at the Disarmament Conference. The debate was still on the extreme end positions of the two sides. The Russians were urging total and complete disarmament within four years. We were urging total and comprehensive disarmament, including an international or United Nations force more powerful than that of any possible combination of national forces, to be arrived at by controlled stages.

It appears wholly unlikely that we will agree to their end position or they to ours. Theirs would leave a situation where a few hidden weapons or a more rapid mobilization capability could be decisive. There would be no outside agency in a position to apply effective sanctions against violations. Our proposal would require the Russians to put

(Continued on page 52)

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National Strategy

(Continued from page 51)

themselves in a position where an outside agency would possess superior and unchallengeable power. I cannot see the Russians agreeing to any such arrangement unless they were sure of being able to control, or at least hamstring, the outside agency.

In examining the possibility of more limited agreements, I am impressed by the interrelation between the problems of inspection, of the determination of violations, and of the application of sanctions in the event of violation. If there is to be no United Nations force capable of imposing effective sanctions in the event that a violation has been determined, then the existing agreements must be self-enforcing by the parties to them. The means available for enforcement are in essence the abrogation of the agreement, followed by some form of race for the most rapid mobilization. Abrogation would be a dangerous sanction, not to be undertaken lightly.

Several points emerge when one asks whether such limited agreements can ease the Cold War problems which we now foresee. The first point is that not much relief can be expected unless the agreements get to the heart of our

anticipated difficulties, particularly the danger that one side or the other may strive for a Class A military capability—one with which it could hope to win a nuclear war by utilizing the advantages of the initiative. The second point is that it cannot be assumed that the agreements will continue to be honored unless honoring them continues to be to the interest of each of the parties. The key question is whether the Soviet Union and Communist China realize, or can be brought to realize, that it is to their interest to restrict themselves to a Class B nuclear capability and to have us know that they are so restricting themselves. Only if that condition can be met do I see much hope that arms control agreements will add to the stability of international nuclear relationships—to the prospect that the Cold War can be kept cold.

'No Simple Solution'

What then should we do? I see no simple solution. In the first place, we have to have a secure deterrent force; this we are now trying to achieve. I would only wish that we were doing it faster. Secondly, we should continue to recognize that such a deterrent force, by itself, is an inadequate and insecure foundation for policy and that

we need more. If we can see any possibility of working out reciprocal actions with the Russians whereby mutual deterrence can be made substantially more secure, we should continue to strive for that goal. If, however, we find the Communists have moved over to a harder line, I should think we should batten down the hatches and put a great deal more effort into striving for that military posture which would at a maximum give us a true Class A capability and which at a minimum should persuade the Russians and the Chinese Communists that they had better negotiate with us for agreement rather than for the purpose of humiliating us or doing us in.

In conclusion, I should point out that while we are wrestling with the politico-military foundations of our policy we cannot in any way neglect its other aspects. There is much to be done in the economic field, in the psychological and purely political fields, and in the quality of our diplomacy.

Perhaps the most important point of all is that we restore precision and accuracy to our thinking about the issues of our policy as a nation and to the words we use in talking about them. Platitudes put out merely to ease the problems of one day can really do us in. ■

The Grumman A2F-1 In

Traffic Management

(Continued from page 21)

which governs MTMA's relationships with the other services.

Probably one of the greatest recommendations that affects the Department of Defense has lain dormant for years, yet it contains the probable solution to DOD's traffic management problems. It was a Hoover Commission recommendation that simply stated:

"That the Secretary of Defense establish a Director of Transportation having no responsibilities except those pertaining to traffic and transportation. He should have all necessary authority to direct the traffic management activities, passenger and freight, in all the military services, including the coordination and consolidation of functions and facilities, to the extent that his office determines it to be necessary and practicable. He should report to and be subject only to the overriding authority of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics."

One example of the current miasma which has resulted from the scattered authority in the present tri-manager setup was a decision by a former Assistant Secretary of Defense (Supply & Logistics). Originally, MTMA was assigned the responsibility for all traffic management operations within the

Continental United States (CONUS). However, the decision gave the Single Manager for Airlift Services (MATS) the responsibility for negotiation, execution and administration of long-term contracts for air service within the U.S. with commercial airlines.

During DOD appropriation hearings for 1958, Representative James Flood (D-Pa.) said:

"... it impresses me that two practical organization changes are necessary: (1) that the Government-owned airline have nothing whatever to do with buying space on commercial airlines for the various military services . . . MATS should be treated as just another airline for the Traffic Management Agency to use. At the present time, U.S. commercial airlines are in the very uncomfortable position of having to try to sell their services to their biggest competition—MATS; (2) the people at MATS should be confined to flying their planes and carrying passengers and cargo as called upon by MTMA. This way MTMA can make use of the unutilized space on commercial airlines first, as our committee intended to be done, then use MATS if it finds commercial airlines cannot do the job."

MSTS, as well as MATS, is engaged in competing with commercial carriers. Although they are both at a service sup-

plier level, they exercise the authority to negotiate and procure by contract, or otherwise, commercial service between the U.S. and overseas areas and within and between points in the U.S. Their "operating" responsibilities do not allow them to be compatible with their responsibility for procuring commercial airlift and ocean transportation. However, this was one basic reason for the establishment of MTMA. It was organized as an agency to deal with commercial carriers, both in negotiating and procuring service from them.

Because (supposedly) transportation has no boundaries, a single organization for transportation would surely be able to function more smoothly. The current inconsistencies pose many problems for the three M's. Under one roof, they would be able to dispense with boundaries and would be able to provide through-bills-of-lading to much of the cargo originating in the U.S. (which sometimes uses the services of all three in reaching its ultimate destination).

Management decisions would originate from one place instead of the present three. An example of how disjointed the MATS long-term contract operation is: MTMA decides whether the service is necessary, has a representative present as an observer when MATS negotiates the long-term con-

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The FAA, through the years, has followed a program of continually upgrading its facilities to meet the needs of the nation's growing air traffic. Teletype Corporation is proud of its part in providing communications equipment for this vital service.

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tracts and assists the interested service with the execution and administering of the term contracts.

Setting up one agency (using MTMA as a basis) for world-wide traffic management, under a single manager, would produce these advantages:

(1) More efficient freight and passenger transportation service for the Armed Services from commercial transportation companies.

A single agency, taking in all components of DOD, would give one agency the authority and responsibility for movements world-wide, assuring smoother, rapid and completely coordinated responsiveness to military requirements not now possible as responsibility shifts among several agencies.

It would also permit: (a) consolidation of negotiation effort; (b) single point for analysis and review of carrier tariffs, rules, regulations and proposals; (c) single source for preparation and publication of uniform technical regulations in common fields; (d) consolidation of arrangements for group movements of all military services; (e) provision of technical staff assistance service to local transportation officers performing traffic management operations assigned by Single Manager; (f) single source for control and regulation of movement through trans-shipping bottlenecks.

(2) Eliminate duplication and overlapping of effort between and among military departments.

This would permit a reduction of the number of offices performing centralized traffic management functions of the type now assigned to MTMA regional offices with CONUS, resulting in a more economical use of military traffic management resources.

(3) Application of a basic pattern for all organizations performing traffic management responsibilities within DOD.

This would accomplish the original purpose of a single manager.


(4) Assure, under all conditions, efficiency and economy within DOD in the procurement, use, cost and control of commercial transportation services required by military agencies for the movement of freight and passengers.

The advantages listed under (1) would also be applicable to the accomplishment of this objective.

(5) Assure efficient use and control of commercial transportation resources utilized by the military in support of all types of military missions.

Only a single operating agency functioning world-wide under all conditions will gain the necessary experience to intelligently plan for the best use of commercial transportation.

(6) Assure adequate practical training
(Continued on page 59)



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SEPTEMBER 1961

Military-Civilian Working Relationships--Sand in the Gears?

Is marriage the only agreeable relationship between military and civilian personnel? An Army officer analyzes the growing problems and the underlying reasons.

by Lt. Col. John Jay Douglass
Legal Branch
Army Office of Judge Advocate General

I AM MARRIED to a Department of the Army civilian employee. So far as I can determine this is the only satisfactory relationship between an officer of the military forces and a civilian employee. Lest the foregoing be misinterpreted, I am not recommending mass marriages nor do I decry the use of civilians in the military establishment. My statement is based upon observations of working relationships between the two groups. These relationships I believe are so poor that they result in harm to the total military effort.

Since the end of World War II, our literature has been filled with writings on military-civilian relationships. The viewers-with-alarm have written knowingly of the military mind warning the American public that soon the men on horseback would pre-empt the civilian position in our society. In the face of such warnings military publications have urged the necessity for improving the professional military posture in the eyes of the civilian community.

Almost every facet of the complex military-civilian relationships has been amply chronicled, discussed, argued, rationalized and criticized except the day to day working relationship of the military officer with the civilian employee in his office or shop. This area wherein there exists so much misunderstanding has been left untouched by the writers and thinkers probably as being too mundane. Only recently did the Department of Defense publish a pamphlet for reading by the military in defense of the civilian employee in the military establishment.

Behind this publication lurks the

suspicion that there are problems of military-civilian employee relationships which obstruct the efficient operation of the armed services. It is not enough to publish brochures explaining in honeyed words that Americans both in and out of uniform are needed to man our defense mechanisms.

It is better that the day-to-day relationship of the civilian employee in the defense establishment and uniformed personnel be critically examined and as objectively as possible—at least to determine if there are areas of conflict.

The Question: 'Why?'

If there are conflicts it is unlikely that school solutions may be found for the irritants between the two groups. A frank appraisal of the situation may serve to highlight the difficulties. If we know the question, someone may determine the answer and the answer may actually be in seeing the problem. In any event it is certainly not sufficient to sermonize on broad policy considerations if too many of the conflicts are those engendered by emotions and the very day-to-day proximity of the parties.

Each group—the serviceman and the civil service employee—can, in an objective analysis, accept the presence of the other and the need therefore. Such objective analysis will not, however, serve to oil the working machinery sufficiently if the sands of daily conflict have clogged the works. These day-to-day irritants, unlike the oyster, seldom produce pearls. They are created by difference in status which

is then exemplified by questions of attitude, pay, promotion, prestige, tenure and privileges. It is these specifics as they relate to each class or group which require consideration.

If there are problems, and all agree there are, it may well be asked why then are civilians in the military establishment anyway? It will be assumed that there need be no discussion of why the military are in the military establishment—though see below. The official answer to the place of the civilian employee is found in the Statement of Personnel Policy for Civilian Personnel in the Department of Defense which declares:

"The Department of Defense is responsible for the security of our country. Civilian employees share fully in that responsibility. Use of civilian employees affords abilities not otherwise available, assures continuity of administration and operation, and provides a nucleus of trained personnel necessary for expansion in any emergency. Because civilian employees free military personnel for primarily military duties, they shall be utilized in all positions which do not require military skills or military incumbents for reasons of training, security, or discipline."

This statement is a rationalized and refined declaration of the wartime policy of saving military manpower. It is significant that it was only after World War II that the use of civilians in the military establishment became so widespread. Having filled the jobs, it may then have become necessary to



grind out such statements as rationalizations to retain the civilian forces.

Accepting these guidelines, however, the observer is sometimes at a loss to determine why a specific job has been civilianized or militarized. For instance, career military officers are generally considered to be politically ignorant, but there are no civilians doing liaison for the Army with the Congress.

On the other hand, the position responsible for coordinating all military programs in at least one Army area is held by a civilian. It is difficult to fit these special situations and many thousands more into criteria listed in the DOD policy statement. Considering the historical background and the actual facts, it is even more difficult to understand how some spokesman can declare certain positions in the military service are to be occupied inherently by a civilian.

In recent years, some of the more articulate active and retired military leaders, specifically, Admiral Rickover and General Medaris, have spoken out against the number of civilians in the military service, particularly in the Pentagon policy making fields. These statements are to be contrasted to the view expressed by Representative Davis of Georgia, Chairman of the House Civil Service Subcommittee on Manpower, who began an investigation in August 1960 on the use of military personnel in Defense Department civilian jobs.

A Bad Teacher

The announcement of this investigation was enough to make most military personnel apoplectic and it is assumed that the report and "recommendations" for correcting abuses (which would appear to pre-judge the results of the investigation) will be the cause for numerous coronaries in the Pentagon. It does seem incongruous that a Congressional Committee would be disturbed that military personnel are involved in the management level of the Defense establishment. One can see why the AFGE would strive to protect the prerequisites of its union members and enlarge the sphere of their activities, but it is somewhat strange to see a former Regular Army colonel, now in Congress, join the battle against the use of military personnel in positions which have been "historically and inherently" civilian.

History is sometimes a bad teacher, but there have even been military figures who served as Secretary of War. At the period of transition between administrations, the Washington press gleefully noted that a proposed nominee for Assistant Secretary of Defense

would stop this evil policy of replacing civilians in the armed forces with military personnel.

Indeed, in a press release by the AFGE about this time it was argued that since the next war would be fought merely by pressing buttons, the civilian work force was actually in more danger than the uniformed forces and should replace them entirely. There have been those who facetiously commented that apparently the view of certain segments of our society would have the military forces contracted like Hessian soldiers by GSA, managed by the Civil Service Commission and audited by GAO—maybe this wasn't facetious.

Here to Stay

Am Exch 300 Emp

Regardless of the theory of inherent military or civilian positions disregarding historical precedent, it sometimes seems that our own government is doing more toward eliminating the number of military personnel than all of the world's disarmament conferences have as yet achieved. At the same time the reduction in civilian forces has not kept pace.

There are now more than a million civil service employees. This does not account for the thousands of overseas indigenous employees serving with the forces. It may not be beyond the realm of possibility that we are approaching the period in history when military forces will have a higher ratio of civilians than soldiers. Perhaps the use of KATUSAS in our front line divisions in Korea is not out of line with the trend.

From the foregoing it can be at least agreed that the civil servant with the armed services is here to stay. That being so, we should learn to live together so let's take a look at what happened when civil servants and commissioned officers occupy adjoining desks. The initial conflict so often arises, other than in the Washington area, upon the arrival of the military incumbent to the job. He has changed geography as a result of the new assignment.

As a general rule, the civilian employee on the other hand is home. He has been locally hired and has chosen to reside in the vicinity of the job. Thus, the civilian employee has roots in the local community, enjoys, or at least, has learned to live with the climate, affirms the local political, racial or religious mores of the area and takes pride in the advantages and accomplishments of the community and at times takes perverted pride in the disadvantages.

Almost without fail the military personnel assigned to a station brings with him the social and economic outlook of a different community, state or re-

gion. Quite often the environment of his origin has been overlaid with the cultural and economic thoughts and prejudices gathered from nationwide and even world-wide travel. Infused therein also are the thoughts and emotions of the serviceman's wife who in a large percentage of military families does not even share the regional upbringing of the spouse.

From these differing geographical backgrounds spring the first seeds of disagreement. It should be noted as cited above that this is not generally true at the seat of government where the native Washingtonian is a curiosity and soldier and civilian alike complain of the weather, taxes, prices and traffic. The beginnings of emotional conflicts arise out of local pride. All of us expect the Texan will boast of his home but this same pride, though perhaps less vocal, may be found in us all whether in or out of uniform.

The transient serviceman may be objective enough to refrain from beating his breast about his old hometown of Paducah, but he generally can manage to find fault with the local setup, whatever it may be. Criticism of the home grounds is most often a greater cause for ill-feeling than persistent bragging.

Rubbed Raw

These criticisms may be directed at the climate (the most constant irritant) the local cost of living, the local political and tax structure (more on this later), the lack of hospitality and even the beauty of the indigenous female population. To this list can be added countless other grounds for arguments which arise out of differences in climate, politics, race, religion and culture.

It is sufficient to say that one's hometown pride may be rubbed raw very quickly by the caustic comments of a loud mouthed newcomer who may be present only as a result of military orders.

There are political scientists and historians who embrace the economic theory of determination. Whether we individually agree with the economist or Freud as to whether the pocketbook or sex is the greatest influence, certainly the contents of the wallet affect our day to day life. Notwithstanding this economic determination theory, specific payrolls of civilians and military appear to cause less strife than many other conditions. This may be in part because the Government payscale is so complicated, whether civilian or military, that even the recipient does not understand it.

The concluding portion of this article by Lt. Col. Douglass will appear in the October issue of AFM.



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Traffic Management

(Continued from page 54)

for military personnel to fit them for traffic management assignment at posts, camps and stations world-wide.

(7) Better potential for arranging through services.

This would allow a single agency to consummate arrangements with various transportation mode combinations as well as negotiate for direct service between inland points in U.S. and offshore points in foreign countries as well as in U.S. territories and possessions.

(8) Greater recognition of traffic management as an important and necessary tool of supply management and logistical support.

With the present scatter-shot operation, field commanders in overseas areas are improperly orientated as to the necessity of integrating traffic management considerations into their logistics systems.

(9) A direct support of world-wide logistics missions of the military services.

A single agency, dealing locally with various elements of world-wide mission activities, will be in a better position to be responsive to the needs of the individual services.


Establishment of a separate agency would require a DOD reorganization placing supply management and logistics support elements (not in direct support of military operations, which must be left under the command and control of the field commander) with the common service elements in a single military organization separate and distinct from the now existing military departments. As a result of the latest addition to the Defense Reorganization Act, the power was given to the Secretary of Defense to make changes to the logistics organization.

Already studies are being made at the Defense Department level which are aimed at combining or consolidating the commodity single managers of operating agencies which, if done, forms the nucleus for combining all common service and supply agencies.

One of the major advantages of having traffic management functions under a separate DOD agency would be the elimination of the distrust one military department has of another when an agency serves its parent organization, as well as the other two services. This will always exist as long as the organizational setup is that of single managements.

The present situation, as it now stands, with three different agencies serving all the services, could very well be summed up with the old saying that: "A man cannot serve two masters, and serve both well."

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
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
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predictable by test... proved by performance

In the receiving areas, in the materials test laboratory, on the production lines, in assembly and at the final test station . . . wherever you look in the Arma plant you'll see quality control and inspection equipment in use. Here rests the responsibility for maintaining the reliability of Arma systems.

And, Arma systems are famous for reliability: All-inertial guidance for the Atlas ICBM, a proved system of intercontinental range accuracy . . . the defense

system for the B-52 . . . shipboard fire control and navigation systems . . . anti-submarine warfare systems.

Arma's chief contribution to our national defense effort is the ability to deliver reliable systems—on schedule and within the budget. All research and development, engineering and production are based on that philosophy. Arma, a division of American Bosch Arma Corporation, Garden City, New York.

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The Advantage

HERE

How the Phantom II Affects Multiple-Mission Economy

The combat value of an aircraft carrier is directly related to the strike capability of its aircraft. Navy planners, seeking to increase the combat potential of aircraft carriers, are vitally aware of the economic advantages of aircraft capable of more than one mission. The Navy's new two-mission fighter, the Phantom II, can effectively deliver huge loads of conventional or nuclear ground strike weapons while retaining full capability for instant conversion to an air-to-air fleet defense mission.

Sparrow III missiles for anti-air warfare are semi-submerged in the fuselage and are carried on all missions. The Phantom II literally flies its own cover on ground attack missions because it retains full capability for air defense at any time.

Great numbers of conventional bombs, napalm or fuel tanks, or nuclear weapons are slung beneath the wings and the fuselage for delivery against ground targets. Simply varying the armament load of the Phantom II fits the carrier force to shifting combat situations regardless of weather, day or night.

Multi-mission weapons delivery capability is but one of the advantages of this Mach 2+ fighter. Performance is another. The Phantom II demonstrated maneuverability, range and speed in capturing world closed course speed records for both 100 and 500 kilometers. It has reached an altitude of 98,560 feet and has a dash speed in excess of 1500 mph. The combat-equipped Phantom II operates easily from existing 5000 foot runways.



MCDONNELL

Phantom II and F-101 Fighter and Attack Aircraft •

*Project Mercury, Aeroballistic and Re-entry Research Spacecraft • Talos and Typhon Airframes •
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